




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13

THE AMERICAN CAPTURE OF FORT GEORGE, ONTARIO

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THE GUARDHOUSE AT FORT GEORGE, ONTARIO

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NATIONAL HISTORIC PARKS
AND SITES BRANCH

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Ontario

by Margaret Coleman

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Abstract

During the War of 1812, Fort George, near the mouth of the Niagara River, acquired particular strategic importance and its capture became desirable from the American point of view. On 27 May 1813 the Americans successfully attacked the fort and occupied it until December of that year. Throughout that time they were prevented by the British from extending their control beyond the immediate area of the fort. On 10 December 1813 Newark was burned and Fort George abandoned to advancing British forces. It remained in British hands during the remainder of the war although American forces camped close to the fort and another attack was threatened in July 1814. Largely because of poor management, the Americans were frustrated in all their attempts to invade Upper Canada through the Niagara peninsula.

Submitted for publication 1974, by Margaret Coleman,
National Historic Parks and Sites Branch, Ottawa.

Abrégé

En signant le traité de Jay en 1796, les Britanniques cédaient le fort Niagara aux Américains. Ils devaient bientôt compenser cette perte en construisant le fort George sur la rive ouest du Niagara, à environ un mille au sud du lac Ontario. En fait, le nouveau fort servit surtout d'avant-poste aux autorités britanniques du Haut-Canada et de base pour les opérations du British Indian Department jusqu'au déclenchement des hostilités, en juillet 1812.

Situé à la frontière américaine, face au fort Niagara, le fort George revêtait une importance stratégique pour les Américains en leur fournissant un tremplin pour se lancer à la conquête du Canada, bien qu'ils aient perdu tout espoir de remporter la victoire. Il était en effet fort difficile d'organiser une bonne armée avec des hommes qui n'avaient pas vécu d'expériences militaires depuis la Révolution.

Les attaques américaines de 1812 le long de la frontière nord des Etats-Unis se soldèrent par un échec. Au fort Niagara, un général inexpérimenté fut plus ou moins secondé par un secrétaire à la Guerre et un commandant désorganisé. Affaibli par le manque de collaboration d'un officier de l'armée régulière peu porté à appuyer son homologue de la milice, et pressé de passer à l'action par des troupes inexpérimentées et indisciplinées, il fit néanmoins traverser le Niagara à ses hommes, en octobre 1812. L'engagement qui suivit, la bataille de Queenston, fut désastreux pour les Américains.

L'année 1813 s'annonçait beaucoup plus prometteuse pour

les Américains: ils capturèrent York et, le 27 mai, le fort George qu'ils détruisirent presque au complet. Cependant la garnison britannique qui occupait le fort réussit à s'échapper, le commandant américain ayant attendu une journée avant de lancer en vain ses troupes à la poursuite de l'ennemi. Par la suite, les Américains connurent un mauvais été, confinés dans un fort assiégé par les troupes qu'ils n'étaient pas parvenus à capturer. Ils s'occupèrent principalement à la reconstruction du fort.

En juillet, le général Dearborn, vieilli et malade, était remplacé temporairement par le brigadier-général Boyd, mais ce dernier avait reçu ordre de limiter son action à la défense. Lorsqu'il reçut enfin la permission de passer à l'attaque avec l'appui de la flotte, le commodore Chauncey était occupé ailleurs. Quant au général Wilkinson, le successeur de Dearborn, il ne passa qu'un mois au fort George et fut malade pendant la majeure partie de son séjour; ses instructions étaient de faire avancer les troupes vers Sackets Harbor, avant de les envoyer attaquer Montréal. Le colonel Scott, qui hérita de son commandement, était un homme compétent et énergique, mais il ne resta en poste qu'une semaine et demie. Le général McClure, de la milice de New York, prit la relève. Ses hommes étaient inexpérimentés et incompetents, et ses demandes de secours furent entendues trop tard. A l'approche des Britanniques, McClure prit panique, brûla Newark et abandonna le fort George. Sa réaction s'avéra bientôt lourde de conséquences: vers la fin de 1813, le fort Niagara était lui aussi tombé aux mains des Britanniques, qui dominaient également la situation à la frontière, le long du Niagara.

Vers 1814, le commandement américain était beaucoup plus compétent et les troupes de Brown étaient bien mieux entraînées. Celui-ci projetait de reprendre le fort George, mais ses plans furent contrecarrés par Chauncey qui,

circonspect, ne lui fournit pas l'artillerie et les troupes supplémentaires dont il avait besoin. En signant le traité de Gand la veille de Noël de 1814, les deux camps se retrouvèrent sur leurs positions d'avant-guerre.

Les attaques américaines de 1812 et 1814 avaient été vouées à l'échec, tandis que celle de 1813 n'eut pour toute suite glorieuse que l'occupation du fort et la possession des deux rives du Niagara sur une distance permettant aux Etats-Unis de faire remonter leurs bateaux jusqu'au lac Erié. Wilkinson avait donc vu juste en analysant la situation en septembre 1813: le fort George ne dominait que le terrain qu'il occupait: il ne put répondre aux besoins en défense, ne fit rien gagner, et ne protégea aucunement le pays. Une administration incompétente a contribué pour beaucoup à l'échec des Américains dans leurs tentatives d'envahir le Haut-Canada par la péninsule du Niagara. Leur retraite allait entraîner de lourdes pertes matérielles et humaines sur leur propre territoire.

Vers 1815, le fort George, en tant qu'installation la plus importante des Britanniques, était remplacé par le fort Mississauga, dont la construction à l'embouchure du Niagara avait été entreprise au printemps de 1814. Le quartier général demeura toutefois à l'ancien fort jusqu'à ce qu'il emménage à York (Toronto), en 1826. Les dernières troupes quittèrent le fort George en 1828, ce qui marqua le début de sa dégradation.

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The research involved in the preparation of this report was done at the Library of Congress and the National Archives in Washington, D.C. The staffs of both these institutions have been very helpful to me. In particular I would like to mention Mr. George Chalou of the Old Military Branch of the National Archives.

Introduction

In 1796, in accordance with Jay's Treaty, the British relinquished Fort Niagara to the Americans. To replace and counterbalance it, Fort George was constructed during the closing years of the 18th century on the west side of the Niagara River about a mile south of Lake Ontario. Until 1812 the new fort saw no military action; it served mainly as an outpost representing British authority in Upper Canada and as a base for the operation of the British Indian Department. With the outbreak of war in 1812, however, Fort George assumed a new importance, facing Fort Niagara and the American border as it did. An American attempt at invasion of the Niagara peninsula in 1812 failed miserably, but in May of 1813 they were successful in capturing and occupying Fort George. American headquarters on the Niagara frontier remained at the fort until December of 1813 when, with a greatly reduced garrison and in fear of advancing British forces, the current commander retreated to his own soil.

At the time of their capture of Fort George, the Americans almost completely destroyed the existing fort; during their tenure they rebuilt it in a new form. The British reoccupied the fort in December 1813, but by 1815 it had been replaced as the major installation by the new Fort Mississauga which had been begun at the mouth of the Niagara River in the spring of 1814. Headquarters, however, remained at the old fort until they were transferred to York in 1826. The last troops were moved from Fort George in 1828 and the fort fell into decay.

Fort George was reconstructed (between 1936 and 1940) by the Niagara Parks Commission to its pre-1812 dimensions. In 1969 it was transferred to the National Historic Parks and Sites Branch of the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs.

The War of 1812 saw Fort George at the height of its importance and during that period it was either being eyed or occupied by the Americans. Therefore a consideration of what they thought about it, saw and did there is necessary to any balanced study of the fort and this report is an attempt to provide just that.

1812

On 4 June 1812 the United States House of Representatives passed a declaration of war against Great Britain by a vote of 79 to 49; the Senate followed suit, 19 to 13, on the seventeenth, and on 18 June, President Madison's signature made it official. Canada was the obvious place to strike at Britain and among the most vocal supporters of war there existed a general feeling that its conquest could be easily arranged, that it was "a mere matter of marching."¹ A considerable proportion of the Upper Canadian population was American in origin and with any luck they would join their former compatriots when they appeared in force. Britain was deeply involved in a European war and could not devote her immense resources to the defence of Canada. It was questionable how much support the French Canadians would provide. And the Canadian frontier - long, relatively sparsely populated and dependent on a single line of communication from Quebec, Montreal and Kingston west - would be difficult to defend.

Madison had hoped for a concentrated strike at Montreal which would immediately secure Upper Canada and "cut off the sap that nourished Indian hostilities."² This was not, however, practicable at that time. When war was declared there were only about 6,700 regulars in service and 5,000 new recruits and these were spread throughout the country. Support for the war in New York was divided and the governors of Connecticut and Massachusetts refused to call out the militia on the grounds that no invasion was taking

place. For these reasons the president turned to a plan suggested by Major General Henry Dearborn. Montreal would remain the main target, but secondary thrusts would be organized from Detroit, Niagara and Sackets Harbor.

The offensive from Detroit during the summer of 1812 was a total failure. Brigadier General William Hull, the governor of the Michigan Territory, who had been named commander of the Northwest Army, arrived at Detroit on 5 July. He occupied Sandwich on the twelfth, but stopped short of taking Fort Malden, which was weakly defended at the time. Distressed by the news that Fort Michilimackinac had surrendered on 17 July, hearing that British regulars were approaching and frantically worried about his supply line, Hull retreated to Detroit on 8 August. Meanwhile Major General Isaac Brock, administrator of Upper Canada and commander of the forces there, was on his way with reinforcements from Fort George. Brock knew from captured documents that Hull was anxious about his safety. On 15 August he sent a messenger demanding Hull's immediate surrender and warning that if fighting began he could not guarantee his control over the behaviour of the large number of Indians who had joined him. Hull refused but the threat was effective. When the British opened fire from a battery at Sandwich and Brock and his troops crossed the Detroit River on the sixteenth with the apparent object of attack, Hull surrendered.

June 1812 found the preparations for action along the Niagara frontier nonexistent. Dearborn, a distinguished veteran of the revolutionary war and a former secretary of war under Jefferson, had been appointed commander of the Northern Department, but he seemed confused about the extent of his responsibility. After establishing headquarters at Albany in early May, he spent the next two months in Boston worrying about the attitude of the New Englanders and

defences along the coast there. On 20 July he wrote to Secretary of War Eustis, "who is to have the command of the operations in Upper Canada? - I take it for granted, that my command does not extend to that distant quarter."³ Eustis replied that it did indeed and, on the very day on which Brock was demanding Hull's surrender, wrote to him that considering the urgency of a Diversion in favor of General Hull under the circumstances attending his situation, the President thinks it proper that not a moment should be lost in gaining possession of the British Posts at Niagara and Kingston, or at least the former, & proceeding in cooperation with General Hull in securing Upper Canada.⁴

Along the Niagara frontier the prospect of attack was greeted with alarm. Just before word of the declaration of war arrived, Colonel Philetus Swift and Benjamin Barton wrote to Governor Tompkins of New York that the British across the river were strengthening their fortifications and training their militia. If war were declared and they remained in their "defenceless situation," they predicted the fall of Fort Niagara, which was in a "miserable and decayed situation" and could make "but feeble defence."⁵ Similar fears were expressed by Congressman Peter B. Porter, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, as he returned home to Black Rock to a wartime career in the New York militia.⁶ And Brigadier General William Wadsworth wrote on 6 July that Fort Niagara, with its 6-pounders and ammunition for only an hour's defence, was facing a much stronger Fort George with its 12-pounders across the river.⁷

One of the few people in a position of authority who seemed ready to organize the war effort without further delay was the Republican Governor Daniel D. Tompkins of New York. Tompkins asked Eustis either to appoint a regular

officer to command the New York militia or to permit him to name a general from the militia. Eustis favoured the latter course, and Tompkins appointed as major general a prominent Federalist without military experience, Stephen Van Rensselaer. Van Rensselaer then appointed as his aide a relative who had some military experience in the Indian wars, Colonel Solomon Van Rensselaer. An American major general in the militia possessed potentially much greater power than his Canadian counterpart who was outranked by regular officers. (In the United States, when militia and regulars were serving together, the officer holding the superior rank would command, regardless of his regular or militia status; however, a regular officer of any grade within a rank would have precedence over any militia officer of the same rank.)

Van Rensselaer's command extended from St. Regis along the St. Lawrence, Lake Ontario, the Niagara River and Lake Erie to Pennsylvania and he was to consider himself "vested with liberal and ample discretion...to adopt all such measures offensive and defensive" as his judgement should dictate.⁸ He arrived on the Niagara frontier in mid-August and found fewer than 2,000 men stretched out along the 36-mile border, and many of these were without shoes and were behind in pay. Morale and discipline were bad and there were serious shortages of ammunition, heavy ordnance, artillerists, tents, camp equipment and medical services.⁹ Shortly after his arrival, however, Van Rensselaer was informed that an armistice had been arranged by Dearborn and Sir George Prevost, governor of British North America, after word had been received of the repeal of the British orders in council. Discussion of the terms took place on 18 and 19 August between the British and Americans on the Niagara frontier, at which time they agreed to give each other four day's notice of the end of the armistice. The period of

peace was useful to the Americans in that they were able to transport supplies to Niagara by water rather than by the very poor land routes available. Madison, however, disapproved of the armistice and at the end of the month Van Rensselaer was ordered to notify the British that it would not be continued. Van Rensselaer reported to Dearborn that he felt in no way prepared for "the approaching crisis," that he lacked almost everything, that Hull's surrender had "spread great alarm among the inhabitants on this Frontier" and that he perceived "strong symptoms of distrust among the troops." In contrast, the enemy appeared alert and were regularly receiving reinforcements of men and ordnance. "Indeed," he declared, "almost every point of any importance from Fort Erie to Fort George, is in some state of defence."¹⁰ The impact of Hull's surrender was intensified by the sight of prisoners (Canadians who had joined Hull) being conducted along the British shore to Fort George. Peter B. Porter wrote to Governor Tompkins that on 27 August the Americans had watched prisoners being marched like cattle from Fort Erie to Fort George "guarded by Gen'l Brocks' regular troops with all the parade and pomp of British insolence and we incapacitated by the Armistice and our own weakness from giving them the relief they seemed anxiously to expect." And then on the twenty-seventh some of these prisoners were shot at Fort George within sight of the American troops.¹¹

Most of September seems to have been devoted to preparations for attack on both sides of the river. Van Rensselaer's letters speak mainly of discipline problems, the inadequacies of the Niagara fortifications and the deficiencies of men and supplies. Dearborn continued to assure him that troops were on the way, but for a variety of reasons they were slow to arrive; "a strange fatality," he wrote, seemed to have "pervaded the whole arrangements."¹² His mood turned to despair when he talked of abandoning Fort

Niagara and making arrangements for a retreat if an attack came, and back to hope when he told Van Rensselaer in September that they must, "at all events...calculate on possessing Upper Canada before winter sets in."¹³

At Fort Niagara some preparations were being made for an attack from Fort George; the roof of the messhouse there was removed, cannon were mounted in its place and a battery was established above the fort.¹⁴ Brock, observing what he took to be preparations for "active operations," requested troops from Colonel Henry Procter at Amherstburg and Lieutenant General Sir George Prevost, the governor.¹⁵

Looking across the Niagara in September, Van Rensselaer was alarmed to see that the British were busy fortifying their position at Fort George and that seven 24-pounders taken at Detroit had been mounted there.¹⁶ Major General Roger Hale Sheaffe, commander of the Niagara frontier, provided further details in a letter of 24 September.

We have been very busy in Fort George on the River side a Curtain as high as the Picket has been raised from the flat bastion to that on the right flank, on which are an eighteen and a twelve pounder on Travelling platforms of the new construction - the bastion on the left flank of that side, in which provisions were stored, has been filled up to be converted into a cavalier, on which one of your twentyfours is to be mounted - another has been mounted at the battery (improved) at a short distance above the fort, and a third has been substituted for the twelve pounder near Missisaga Point - a mortar (8 inch) is laid between Wallace's and Clench's in a line with the big house, commandant's house and North blockhouse - I suppose that I mentioned in

a former letter the transformation of the "Big House" into a battery - the wheels of three carriages press over the wall - of the roof there remain some of the Rafters of the east end.¹⁷

Tension seems to have been high, with troops on both sides eager for a fight. An American observer at Lewiston noted that "notwithstanding the most positive orders on both sides, our sentinels have kept up almost a constant warfare for a month past. On the bank of the river musket balls are about as thick as whippowills on a summer's evening."¹⁸ Brock and Van Rensselaer exchanged correspondence on the subject¹⁹ and each declared he would do his best to prevent its recurrence, but controlling this "warfare of Sentries" was an extremely difficult task.

By early October, reinforcements had begun to arrive. Brigadier General Alexander Smyth had arrived at Buffalo on 29 September with 1,650 regulars; Van Rensselaer had about 900 regulars and 2,650 militia near his headquarters at Lewiston, and the total strength along the frontier was about 6,000. On 8 October Van Rensselaer felt confident enough to outline a plan of attack to Dearborn. He proposed that they concentrate the regulars around Fort Niagara and the militia at Lewiston. He would then cross the river from Lewiston and "carry the heights of Queenstown" while the regulars would move by boat from Four Mile Creek near Fort Niagara "to a point in the rear of the works of Fort George, and take it by storm."²⁰ Presumably the garrison at Fort George would rush out to Queenston upon Van Rensselaer's approach and at this point General Smyth and his regulars would cross the river at its mouth and easily take Fort George.

With this plan in mind, Van Rensselaer requested a meeting with Smyth, Major General Hull and the commandants of the regiments on the frontier. Smyth had never been

inclined to serve under a mere militia general and upon his arrival at the Niagara he had not met personally with Van Rensselaer. Instead he had written him a letter stating that he considered the stretch between Fort Erie and Chippawa the safest place for a crossing and therefore he was camping with his troops near Buffalo.²¹ Neither Van Rensselaer's request for a meeting with him, nor an order which followed, met with any response. On the tenth Van Rensselaer notified Smyth that he intended to attack Queenston Heights that night and ordered him to march to his headquarters. Smyth did not comply and in fact the attack was cancelled when an officer rowed across the river in a boat containing all the oars and then abandoned it. Again Van Rensselaer ordered Smyth to a conference and this time he replied. His men "might" march in two days' time; he had been joined by Colonels Winfield Scott and John Christie, and the time was favourable for attack.²²

By now Van Rensselaer was anxious and wanted to confer with the other officials in the region. His hand was forced, however, because "the ardour of those under his immediate orders had been heated by disappointment, and numbers now proposed to him the alternative, of marching against the enemy, or marching home."²³ He conferred with the principal officers at his camp and found they wanted to attack. As a result he launched his second attempt at Queenston on the night of 12-13 October, without the help of Smyth, to take Fort George.

Briefly, the Americans landed successfully and soon established themselves on the heights; Brock was killed while leading the first detachment which had rushed from Fort George to meet them. Sheaffe soon followed with the garrison from that fort and was joined by a party of Indians and the troops from Chippawa. Many of the militia still at Lewiston refused to cross the river to support their

comrades; the Americans now saw themselves outnumbered and they began retreating. Before they could all do so, many were forced to surrender. Those who were taken prisoner were conducted to Fort George. Of these, those from the militia were paroled on their word of honour not to fight against Britain or her allies again during the war or until regularly exchanged. Some regulars were exchanged within a week, but others were sent on to Quebec.

Although the proposed attack on Fort George did not materialize, it was not ignored while the action was taking place. M. Smith, adjutant of the 41st Regiment, described his experience there in a letter to Proctor.

It was nigh 7 o'clock before we Knew of the Enemy's Landing I was Parading the Guards when Major Gen'l Sheaffe Came into the Square & told me not to march them off as he expected the Enemy had attacked Queenston and to get all the men under Arms, which I did without delay, by this time an express had arrived with the information of the Enemy having Landed - about 2/3 of the Men were immediately march'd off Captain Dernzy went with them, and in a short time after the remainder was ordered off (except 4 or 5) with the Militia so that we had not sufficient to man the Battries in the Garrison and down the Line....

as I mentioned before there was not sufficient men left in this Garrison to work the Guns on the Battries there were only 7 of our Reg't and 2 of the 49 & a few Militia & most of them were sent out of Hosp. that day - yet we played on the Opposite Garrison to the best of our Judgement having no Artillery Officer to Direct us & much to our surprise They return'd us

the Compliment by a very well directed fire of Red hot Shott from 6-12 & 18 Pounders.

They burnt in Town the Courthouse & Jail a Dwelling house & Tan yard belonging to Mr. Greer, very early in the day - They also set fire to our Magazein which I assure you alarmed us very much, but by the exertions of a few officers & men left in the Fort, it was extinguished without much damage - One Shott entred out Regimental Store and very luckley it lodged between 2 Bales of Gray greatcoats & Destroyed Nine of them, otherwise I think all Navy Hall would have burned to the ground - But Notwithstanding all their Cruel Efforts we drove them from their Fort by our Shott & Battered it completely - and had Captain Dernzy been permitted (after he return'd from Queenston with Prisoners) when he handsomely Volunteered to go with a Party of our Reg't to Destroy it there would not this day have been one Building Standing, in Place of which it is as strong a hold for the Yankee scoundrels as ever. ...We have Made very strong Sod werk along the two Curtains on the Right & Left of the East Gate which saved us from the Enemie's Fire on the 13th and I wish that it was completed round the Fort. Under the Right Curtain as you enter from Navy Hall is Built a very fine Store for the Ordinance Department & that which was occupied before them is at last fitting up for Barracks which will Contain 100 Men. We were obliged to make use of the New Ordinance Store as an Hospital on the 13th as the range of the Enemies Shott was chiefly in the Direction for the Hospital. The Presbyterian Church is the General Hospital at

Present....The North Bastion is made a Cavalier Battrey and is raised very high and mounts one 24 Pounder (from Detroit) on a Traversing Carrage & will fire almost in every direction - Little did poor General Brock think when he saw it finished on the 12th that it was to be his place of Burial on the 16th....²⁴

As General Brock and his aide-de-camp Lieutenant Colonel Macdonnell were buried, a salute was fired in their honour from Fort Niagara.²⁵

Following the debacle at Queenston Heights, Van Rensselaer offered his resignation to Dearborn, who accepted it and transferred the command to Brigadier General Alexander Smyth. Smyth devoted the next month to planning a second invasion of Canada, an invasion which would involve a number of troops and boats large enough to avoid a repetition of the recent fiasco. To inspire great hordes of men to flock to him to join the invasion to "plant the American standard in Canada" and wipe out the disgrace of Queenston, he proceeded to issue a series of flowery and bombastic proclamations.²⁶ These may have had some effect in rallying support to the American flag, but in addition they served to give the British ample warning of Smyth's intentions.

Following Smyth's assumption of the command on the Niagara, he and Sheaffe had arranged an armistice which could be ended on 24 hours' notice. On 19 November the Americans notified the British that the armistice would terminate on the twentieth at midnight. Hoping to render Fort Niagara ineffective during the forthcoming well-publicized attack on Canada, the British at Fort George opened fire on that fort on the twenty-first. Lieutenant Colonel George McFeeley, commanding Fort Niagara, described the incident to Smyth.

I beg leave to inform you that, on the morning of the 21st Nov. at 6 o'clock, a heavy cannonading opened upon this garrison, from all the batteries at, and in the neighborhood of fort George, which lasted, without intermission, until after sundown. They had 5 detached batteries; 2 mounting 24 pounders, 1 mounting a 9 pounder, and 2 mortar batteries; one ten and a half; and the other five and a half inch - the batteries firing hot shot, which set some of our buildings on fire. But, from the extraordinary vigilance of the officers and men, particularly Major Armistead, of the U.S. corps of engineers, whose indefatigable exertions were extended to all parts of the garrison, the fires were got under, without being observed by the enemy.

Our garrison was not as well provided with artillery and ammunition, as I could have wished; however, the batteries opened a tremendous fire upon them, in return, with hot shot, admirably well directed. Several times, during the Canonading, the town of Newark was in flames; but was extinguished by their engines, as also the centre building in fort George. Their Messhouse, and all the buildings near it, were consumed....

The enemy threw more than 2000 red-hot balls into it [Fort Niagara], and a number of shells, amounting to 180, only one of which did injury to our men.²⁷

The Americans suffered four killed and seven wounded, and the fort certainly was not knocked out of action.

Despite all his talk, the invasion under Smyth never materialized. On 28 November two advance parties were sent across the river. One of these succeeded in doing some

damage across from Black Rock, but the men could not find boats when they tried to retreat and were forced to surrender. The second group attempted to destroy a bridge on the road to Chippawa, but were foiled by a larger British force. Most of the men managed to retreat to American soil, but some did not and surrendered. In light of these developments, the main invading force, which was waiting at the American shore, did not move. Another false start was made on 30 November; the invasion was cancelled at the last minute after a conference of the officers present. The campaign was abandoned for the season and Smyth went home to Virginia, his military career at an end.

1812 had been a disastrous year for the Americans along the northern frontier. They had suffered serious setbacks at Fort Dearborn, Michilimackinac, Detroit and Niagara, and a half-hearted attempt move from Lake Champlain towards Montreal fizzled out before it had amounted to anything. As Thomas Jefferson commented, "so wretched a succession of generals never before destroyed the fairest expectations of a nation."²⁸

The American Capture of Fort George

From the American point of view, the first season of the war had not been a fruitful one and on 3 December, after considerable pressure, Eustis resigned his post as secretary of war. After an interval during which Secretary of State Monroe occupied the post, he was succeeded on 5 February 1813 by John Armstrong, a prominent New York Republican. Within a few days Armstrong presented to the cabinet his thoughts on the future conduct of the war along the northern front. Montreal, he said, should be the main object of the campaign, but an attack there was unfortunately not immediately feasible; an effective operation could probably not be launched before 1 May, shortly before the British were likely to be reinforced. A more practicable goal was the secondary object of the campaign, the reduction as soon as possible of everything in Upper Canada between Prescott and Lake Erie.¹

Madison seems to have agreed that an attack on Montreal would have to be abandoned for the time being. On 10 February 1813 Armstrong communicated presidential orders to Dearborn so that he might begin preparations for the invasion of Canada. According to this plan, Dearborn was to assemble 4,000 troops at Sackets Harbor and 3,000 at Buffalo. The first group would proceed to Kingston and take the town, the garrison and the ships. It would then move on to York to capture its stores and ships. From York the invading force would move to the Niagara frontier where it would be joined by the troops at Buffalo in the achievement of the third

objective, the capture of Forts George and Erie and their dependencies.²

Before this grand plan got under way, Armstrong seems to have considered a foray across the Niagara worth a try. On 23 February 1813 he wrote Colonel Moses Porter, who was commanding the American troops along the Niagara, that the British troops were believed to be weak, that the ice at that season would provide a natural bridge and that he should make "a stroke on such points of the [British] line" as might be within his reach. If he were successful at Fort Erie, it would be "desirable" if he could continue on to Fort George.³ Porter planned an attack, but it did not take place because a deserter informed the British at Fort Erie of the approaching raid.

Meanwhile, Dearborn was on his way to Sackets Harbor to supervise preparation for the campaign. When he arrived there in early March, his principal fear (and that of Commodore Isaac Chauncey, the American naval commander on the Great Lakes) was an attack from Kingston, where he believed a force of 6,000 to 8,000 men to have been collected.⁴ By mid-March he considered that danger to have passed, but reported that he and Chauncey favoured a change in the sequence of attacks on Upper Canada. In their opinion, the first object ought to be York and then Fort George. By then the troops from Buffalo would have taken Fort Erie and Chippawa and be able to join the main body at Fort George. The entire body would then move on to Kingston.⁵ These changes, Armstrong agreed, were "necessary, or at least proper."⁶

On 27 April 1813 the Americans successfully attacked York. From there, in accordance with the new plan, Dearborn moved on to the Niagara peninsula. He reached Fort Niagara on 2 May, having been delivered there by Chauncey, who then returned to York for the rest of the fleet. Dearborn found

that few preparations had been made there for his arrival and it was in fact over three weeks before the army was ready to attack. Troops under General Morgan Lewis and William Winder had not yet arrived from their positions farther up the Niagara river, the necessary boats had not been brought to Fort Niagara or completed and additional armament had not been installed in the fort. Dearborn himself was ill and when the fleet returned with the men from York, large numbers of them were incapacitated either by wounds or illness.

While the sick were recovering their health, Chauncey set out for Sackets Harbor for an additional 1,000 men and a call was sent to Utica, Rome and Oswego for the troops from there. Colonel Winfield Scott, who was both adjutant general and colonel of the 2nd Artillery Regiment, arrived at Fort Niagara on 12 May with 300 of his men.

For those troops who were well, the wait was a subject of complaint. The decision that an attack would definitely be launched was made about 10 May at a meeting of Dearborn with Generals Lewis, Chandler, Boyd, and Winder, and Quartermaster General Swartwout. Preparations were obviously not complete, but the wait seemed interminable. Major Isaac Roach felt that

nothing was done on our part for two weeks excepting the issuing of orders and counter-orders; at one time resigning the command to General Lewis and the same hour ordering the internal arrangement of the division until confidence in our commander was very much diminished.⁷

By 25 May Chauncey had returned with the additional men and preparations began in earnest. On that day Scott issued his general orders for the attack.⁸

Across the river at Fort George, the British had been

keeping as close an eye as possible on the preparations and troop build-up on the opposite shore. By 24 May the commander of the British forces on the Niagara frontier, Brigadier General John Vincent, expected an immediate attack on the fort and possibly at Queenston.⁹ He had at Fort George about 1,000 regulars and 300 militia so the sight of troops pouring into Fort Niagara was not a pleasant one for him. His belief that an attack was coming was reinforced when, early in the morning of 25 May, the Americans began launching boats at Five Mile Meadows, five miles south of the mouth of the river. These were, in fact, being sent down to the lake to join part of the transport for the invasion. Although the British opened fire, which was returned by two 6-pounders in the American boats, ten boats managed to make their way along the river. For about two hours at this time and again about 8:00 A.M., the American artillery under Colonel Moses Porter opened up on Fort George. At Fort Niagara and the nearby batteries there were at least 25 guns and mortars, which fired heated shot into Fort George, where the buildings had been destroyed.¹⁰

The next day, 26 May, Commodore Chauncey and Captain Oliver Hazard Perry, who had arrived the previous night from Lake Erie, examined the British shore and set out buoys to mark the positions for the American ships during the attack.¹¹

Late in the afternoon of 26 May the announcement came that the troops would embark at 3:00 the next morning, after having risen at 1:00 and breakfasted at 2:00 A.M.¹² An assortment of boats and ships had been assembled at Four Mile Creek, east of Fort Niagara on Lake Ontario, and by about 4:00 A.M., when Generals Dearborn and Lewis boarded the flagship Madison, all was ready. Perry recalled the scene in a letter:

A thick mist hanging over Newark and Fort George,
the sun breaking forth in the east, the vessels

all under way, the lake covered with several hundred large boats, filled with soldiers, horses, and artillery, altogether formed one of the grandest spectacles I ever beheld. The breeze now freshened a little, which soon brought us opposite the town of Newark.¹³

The mist rose and, to his alarm, Vincent at Fort George saw before him "the enemy's fleet, consisting of 14 or 15 vessels...standing towards the lighthouse in an extended line of more than two miles, covering from 90 to 100 large boats and scows, each containing an average of 50 or 60 men."¹⁴

As a prelude to the attack, Chauncey directed various schooners to knock out two British batteries, one near the lighthouse at the mouth of the Niagara River and the other at Two Mile Creek two miles along the Lake Ontario shore west of it. The Julia and the Growler positioned themselves in the mouth of the river and with the help of crossfire from the Ontario, north of the lighthouse, that battery was soon silenced. Similar treatment was dealt the battery at Two Mile Creek by the Governor Tompkins and the Conquest. The artillery at Fort Niagara and at its outlying batteries also opened fire and the British were forced "to withdraw all the guards and piquets stationed along the coast between the fort and the lighthouse."¹⁵ At this point Chauncey directed the Hamilton, the Asp and the Scourge to anchor near the shore to cover the landing place about half a mile east of Two Mile Creek.

The advanced guard, led by Scott and consisting of a battalion of the 2nd Artillery and a smaller one under Lieutenant Colonel McFeeley of the 22nd Infantry, then set out.¹⁶ For a few minutes the boats carrying these troops drifted out of position, but they were brought back into line by Perry, who was moving among the boats supervising

their operation. As the force came close to the shore, a party of British appeared on the bank and opened fire. Most of the shot went over the invaders' heads, but it did cause considerable confusion. Many of the men stopped rowing and started firing wildly in every direction. Perry and Scott managed to calm them and they "pulled for the shore with great spirit."¹⁷ Scott and Captain Hindman, also of the 2nd Artillery, led the troops ashore. The beach was narrow and the 7- to 11-foot bank was steep. As the advanced guard tried to climb it, it was met by the Glengarry Light Infantry, which had been sheltered in a gully behind the bank. Scott, avoiding an approaching bayonet, tumbled back down the bank, as did most of the others. Soon, however, the defenders could no longer withstand the fire from the boats and retreated. The Americans were continuing to land troops - field batteries under Moses Porter, the brigades under Boyd, Chandler and Winder, and a reserve under Colonel Macomb. According to Scott, the force totalled about 4,700 men.¹⁸

The advanced guard which had been forced back down the bank now formed again and, backed by Boyd's brigade, made a successful ascent. The main body of the troops were following in three columns; their right was covered by Colonel Porter and his field artillery, and their left and back by fire from Fort Niagara and the ships. Boyd reported that British opposition did not cease with the landing, but that "for fifteen minutes the two lines in front, at a distance of from six to ten yards, exchanged a destructive and rapid fire, till the determined charge of our troops broke down their lines and forced them into the town."¹⁹ The Glengarry Light Infantry, the Royal Newfoundland Regiment and the militia who had come forward to meet the Americans were forced to fall back to join first the advancing 8th Regiment and then the 49th with more militia.

By about 12:00 noon Vincent had seen that he was vastly outnumbered by the Americans and considered that he could not be justified "in continuing so unequal a contest, which promised no advantage to the interests of His Majesty's service." And so, he reported to Prevost, he gave orders "for the fort to be evacuated, the guns to be spiked and the ammunition destroyed." The troops "were put in motion and marched across the country in a line parallel to the Niagara river, towards the position near the Beaver Dams beyond Queenston mountain...."²⁰

As the British retreated, Scott caught a horse which had belonged to the now wounded Colonel Myers, the British acting quartermaster general. While Colonel Miller of the 6th Infantry caught up with the advanced guard, Scott moved slowly through the town of Newark. As he approached Fort George, he saw two men running from the fort. He charged up, took them prisoner and learned from them that most of the garrison had joined the retreating forces. A few men had stayed behind, however, to spike the guns and apply slow fuses to the magazines. Scott then ordered the main body of his troops to pursue the British while companies of the 2nd Artillery led by Captain Hindman and Stockton were to accompany him in an effort to save the ammunition. As they approached the fort, one of the powder magazines blew up, sending a shower of stone and debris down upon Scott. Disregarding the resulting broken collarbone, he entered the fort first and brought down the flag, while Hindman and Stockton managed to save the two remaining magazines.²¹

Scott, whom General Lewis reported "fought nine tenths of the Battle of the 27th,"²² galloped on to join the advanced guard pursuing Vincent. Across from the Five Mile Meadow on the American side, he met Colonel Burn with one troop of the Light Dragoons. As they waited for another troop to cross the river, an order (the second) arrived from

Lewis instructing them to return to Fort George. Scott protested that with the addition of the dragoons he could easily capture the disorganized enemy forces. However Boyd, who outranked Scott, rode up and insisted upon his carrying out the orders and the troops returned to Fort George. Dearborn had watched the proceedings from the Madison and despite Scott's enthusiasm and the arrival of the fresh dragoons, he declared the troops "too much exhausted for any further pursuit." He reported jubilantly to the secretary of war that they were "in possession of Fort George & its immediate dependencies" and that they would continue the pursuit the following day.²³

According to the American tally, the British lost 108 killed and 278 prisoners, and 57 militia were paroled, while the Americans lost 39 killed and 111 wounded.²⁴ According to British sources, they lost 52 killed and 306 wounded and missing.²⁵ Of the British prisoners of war, 23 were put in close confinement in retaliation for an episode at Quebec the previous fall. (Just as a ship carrying Americans who had been exchanged was preparing to leave Quebec, British officers boarded it to check for men of British or Irish descent. Because of their Irish accents, 23 men were taken off and sent to England for trial. Dearborn had been ordered on 15 May to confine 23 British soldiers as hostages until an exchange could be arranged for the Americans then awaiting trial and this he did.)²⁶

As it turned out, the pursuit of the enemy was unsuccessful and, although they had captured the fort, the Americans were to spend an uncomfortable and demoralizing summer hemmed in by the troops they had allowed to escape.

The Summer of 1813 at Fort George

The day after the American success at Fort George, Lieutenant Colonel Preston took possession of Fort Erie. The British forces there had blown up the magazines, abandoned the fort and, along with the detachment from Chippawa, joined the main force under Vincent. Possession of Fort Erie permitted the Americans to move a number of vessels from Black Rock to Lake Erie where they were added to Perry's fleet; this was one of the few gains the Americans enjoyed as a result of their efforts at Fort George.

On 28 May Dearborn, now at the fort, received word that the British were at Beaver Dams near Queenston and sent General Lewis in pursuit. By the time Lewis got there, however, the quarry had left and was moving towards the head of Lake Ontario; Dearborn ordered him back. Lewis had never been noted for his speed or ability to rough it and this occasion was apparently no exception. Peter B. Porter commented on the episode in a letter to Armstrong.

General Lewis is brave & capable, but he is no veni, vidi, vici man - and be assured that he will never overrun the wilderness of Canada. He could not go 16 miles to fight the enemy - not because his force was too small - but because he had not waggons to carry tents & camp kettles for his army. His own baggage moves in two stately waggons, one drawn by two & the other by 4 horses carrying the various furniture of a Secretary of

of State's office, a lady's dressing chamber, an alderman's-dining room, & the contents of a grocer's shop.¹

Dearborn now hoped to cut off the British retreat, which he expected would be to York by water. Chauncey, however, was anxious to proceed to Sackets Harbor where a new ship was being completed (and where, although he was unaware of it, the British staged an attack on 28 May).² He left at the end of the month with 200 men and with his departure the British gained effective control of the lake. The British was able to establish themselves at Burlington, at the head of the lake, and the Americans were unable to dislodge them.

After the success in occupying Fort George, Dearborn seemed to have great difficulty in getting organized. A major factor in this was undoubtedly his health. On 4 June he described himself as "very feeble" and added that General Lewis was also unwell.³

On 1 June Dearborn sent out General William Winder with the 5th, 13th, 14th and 16th Infantry to deal with the British at the head of the lake. Winder marched for several miles, sent for reinforcements, and Chandler set out with another brigade. The two, with a total of about 3,000 men, met at Forty Mile Creek on the fifth and proceeded to the point at which they met the first British picket. After a skirmish the British retired, the 13th and 14th Regiments were sent to the mouth of Forty Mile Creek to cover the boats which were expected there, and the rest of the pursuers camped at Stoney Creek. Fires were kindled, rendering their position easily visible to the enemy. At 3:00 A.M. on 6 June the British attacked, confused fighting ensued and by the time the morning light appeared, the two American generals and 113 others had been captured, 17 had been killed and 38 wounded. With the capture of Generals

Chandler and Winder, Colonel James Burn of the 2nd Light Dragoons found himself in command, called a council of the officers present to consider their "unpleasant dilemma" and decided to retreat to Forty Mile Creek.⁴

When Dearborn heard of these events, he immediately sent out General Lewis to take command, "attack the Enemy as soon as practicable" and make every effort "for preventing the Enemy's escape."⁵ There followed a series of orders to Lewis ordering him first to retreat because a ship which could be British appeared, then to wait and act as he saw fit and finally to withdraw again. Meanwhile, Dearborn wrote to Armstrong and, using a phrase he had employed to describe American difficulties in 1812, wrote that by some "strange fatality" Chandler and Winder had fallen into British hands.⁶

Lewis met his retreating comrades at Forty Mile Creek where they camped for the night. Early that evening the British fleet appeared. By the next morning, after the Americans had fought off both fire on their baggage boats from a British schooner and an attack by a party of Indians on their camp, Lewis received the final order to return to Fort George. The boats were loaded and 200 men were detailed to return in them, but "by some irregularity" they set off without the escort. A British armed schooner caught up with them, some boats escaped and some were run ashore and deserted. Twelve boats containing baggage were thus lost.⁷

The army marched from Forty Mile Creek at 10:00 A.M. and the British immediately moved in. Vincent reported jubilantly to Procter that they had taken "almost all their Boats between 200 and 300 Tents some stores ammunition and many prisoners" and that he therefore expected "to be left quiet here for some days."⁸

On 27 May Armstrong had ordered Dearborn, if he

succeeded in taking Forts George and Erie, to decide which post would be maintained and that "all other forts redoubts or redans on the Niagara belonging to the Enemy" were to be dismantled.⁹ As a result the American detachment at Fort Erie evacuated and burned it on 9 June.

Preparations were now begun to secure American headquarters at Fort George, which had been virtually destroyed at the time of its capture. Dr. James Mann, who was at the fort at the time, recalled that in June and July of 1813, "Fort George was reduced in its dimensions, and its lines of defence strengthened by a deep ditch and palisades. These preparations were in forwardness to recommence operations against the enemy."¹⁰

Conditions within the American camp could not be described as pleasant. Large numbers of the men were sick. Many, and not only the wounded, were suffering aftereffects from disagreeable trips on Lake Ontario in ships not commodious enough to accommodate them at once. Typhoid, which had struck in May, worsened in June and July. After a few hot days in early June, the weather was cold, rainy and miserable. Doctors were in short supply throughout the summer and, not surprisingly, they experienced considerable difficulty keeping healthy themselves.¹¹

The most prominent sick case at Fort George was Dearborn and there is little doubt that this affected his capacity to conduct affairs. On 8 June, after the fiasco at Stoney Creek, he wrote that his poor state of health rendered it extremely painful for him to carry out his duties and unless his health improved he felt he would have to retire for a short time to some place where his mind would be "more at ease."¹² By the tenth he was willing, because of his "temporary indisposition," to relinquish command to Major General Lewis.¹³ Lewis doubted on 14 June whether Dearborn would ever again be fit for service. "He

has been repeatedly in a State of Convalescence, but relapses on the least agitation of Mind," he wrote.¹⁴

Towards the end of June Lewis left Fort George for Sackets Harbor. The unhappy situation he left behind him is reflected in Dearborn's letter of 20 June:

I have been so reduced in strength as to be incapable of any command. Brig. Gen^l. Boyd is the only Gen^l Officer present; and from resignations, sickness, and other contingencies, the number of regimental officers present, fit for duty, are far below what the service requires. A considerable proportion of our army being composed of new recruits, and the weather having been extremely unfavourable to health, the sick have become so numerous, in addition to the wounded as to reduce the effective force far below what would have been contemplated; but if the weather should become favourable, which ought to be expected, a great part of the sick will probably be fit for duty in a short time.¹⁵

By 23 June there were still over 500 in the hospital. General Boyd was in command and, although he gave him some advice, Dearborn was not well enough to assume full responsibility.¹⁶

With the retreat of the Americans into Fort George after the Stoney Creek catastrophe, the pattern was set for the summer. They were virtually confined to their fort by the British, whose outposts were as close as ten miles from camp; Americans were even taken prisoner within two miles of the fort.¹⁷ Dearborn complained that the enemy was constantly sending out parties to gather provisions and harass the Americans. Detachments had been sent to deal with them, but "their friends" gave them "the earliest information & their knowledge of all the byepaths and roads

[enabled] them to evade [American] parties by retreating precipitately on their first approach."¹⁸

On 23 June Colonel C.G. Boerstler set out with 570 men to meet the enemy at Decau's Farm, 16 miles away. On the twenty-fourth, at Beaver Dams, the force was ambushed by about 400 Indians under Dominique Ducharme of the Indian Department. Boerstler fought his way out of the woods where he had been surprised and into an open field, from which he sent for reinforcements. The British forces were strengthened with the arrival of Lieutenant James Fitzgibbon and a detachment of the 49th Foot. Fitzgibbon was able to play on Boerstler's fear of an Indian massacre and to misrepresent to him the size of his own force. As a result, Boerstler surrendered and his 570 men was escorted into the British camp.¹⁹

When Armstrong had learned that the British forces had been allowed to escape after the capture of the fort and again after the affair at Stoney Creek, he wrote to Dearborn:

There is indeed some strange fatality attending our efforts. I cannot disguise from you the surprise occasioned by the two escapes of a beaten enemy: first, on the 27th ulto, and again on the 1st instant. Battles are not gained when an inferior & broken enemy is not destroyed.²⁰

Dearborn's stock in Washington sank further when word arrived of this latest setback. By the end of the month his health had begun to improve and he had resumed the command, and on 6 July he reported that his health was continuing to improve.²¹ Despite these encouraging signs, Armstrong was exasperated. On 6 July he notified Dearborn that the president had ordered his retirement until his health improved.²²

On 15 July, when the order became known at Fort George

and Dearborn prepared to leave, a group of 20 officers present gathered to address him. The present circumstances, they said, were such as to make his presence with them "of the first importance, at this moment, if not absolutely indispensable to the good of the service." To these remarks, which were doubtless a formality, Dearborn replied that the orders left no room for discussion, that he was forced to retire.²³

The day after he ordered Dearborn's retirement, Armstrong notified Brigadier General John Boyd that as he was now the senior officer on the spot, the command fell to him until it was specifically assigned to someone else.²⁴ Boyd, a veteran of the revolutionary war who had served many years as a mercenary in India, did not inspire confidence in those around him. Morgan Lewis described him as "a compound of ignorance, vanity and petulance, with nothing to recommend him, but that species of bravery in the field, which is vamping, boisterous, stifling reflection, blinding observation and better adapted to the Bully of a Brothel than the Soldier."²⁵ To Peter B. Porter, he was amiable enough, but too weak to command an army.²⁶ Winfield Scott saw him as "courteous, amiable, and respectable, as a subordinate; but vacillating and imbecile, beyond all endurance, as a chief under high responsibilities."²⁷

Even if he had been a highly talented military commander, Boyd would have had some difficulty in displaying his skill under the orders given him by Armstrong. According to these, he was to obey Generals Lewis and Hampton, "pay the utmost attention to the instruction & discipline of the Troops and engage in no affair with the Enemy" that could be avoided.²⁸ Nor was he entirely well. In accepting the command, he renewed a request for a furlough he had requested previously: "I was suffering under a camp fever & a liver complaint, and requested, as soon as

the situation of affairs should allow of the indulgence, a reasonable furlough for the recovery of my health."²⁹ And he appears to have had little confidence in his position: "While Gen^l. Dearborn and Gen^l. Lewis were in command, they did not think it necessary to consult a subordinate; I therefore am not in possession of any information relative to the present campaign, or instructions for my own Government."³⁰

The remainder of the summer saw no major action at Fort George, only a continuation of the skirmishing which had begun in June. Scott recalled that "the army of Niagara, never less than four thousand strong, stood fixed, in a state of ignominy for some two months, under Boyd, within five miles of an untrenched enemy never more than three thousand five hundred men."³¹ Peter B. Porter reported in disgust in late July that

the truth is...that we have had an army at Ft George for two months past which, at any moment of this time, might be a vigorous & well directed exertion of 3 or 4 days, have prostrated the whole of the enemy's face in this division of the country. And yet this army lies panic-struck - shut up, and whipped in by a few hundred miserable Savages, leaving the whole of this frontier, excepting the mile in extent which they occupy, exposed to the inroads & depredations of the enemy.³²

The skirmishes were regular occurrences and the men were kept in a continuous state of readiness to repulse the attackers. Several individual episodes were reported to the authorities. In early July Lieutenant Eldridge and 32 men of the 13th Regiment were sent out to cut off some Indians who had attacked American pickets. They were attacked by

British Indians. A few escaped, many were killed and tomahawked and most of the others were taken prisoner.³³ On 17 July Boyd told of an attack by 250 British and Indians which had resulted in three or four American deaths. "Had not our Troops been restrained by orders founded on your instructions," he told Armstrong, "they would undoubtedly have made the enemy suffer for his temerity. Probably induced by our seeming inactivity, he is constantly in the neighbourhood of our Piquets, and frequently attacking them in small bodies."³⁴

Brigadier General David Williams, whom Armstrong had sent to Fort George in early July, wrote the secretary of war on 3 August of the difficulty of life at the fort.

The service here is exceedingly hard owing to the great detail for the piquet & camp guards, for fatigue & forage parties....We are alarmed almost every night and are under arms a considerable portion of each. I have not slept without my clothes being on, since my arrival within his Majesty's dominion - & what is infinitely worse to my mind, than all this - we have no information whatever, not derived from deserters, of which you know well how to estimate.³⁵

The only major attack of the summer was made by the British on 24 August. Prevost, impatient at the lack of decisive action, came down to the Niagara frontier in August and "found 2000 British soliders on an extended line cooping up in Fort George an American force exceeding 4000 men." Anxious to examine the fort and its defences, he ordered a "general demonstration" at Fort George. He described the episode in a letter to Lord Bathurst, Secretary for War and the Colonies.

This service was executed to my entire

satisfaction. The piquets were driven in, a great part of them taken with a very trifling loss, and I found myself close to the fort and the new entrenched camp which is formed on the right of that work, both of them crowded with men, bristled with cannon and supported by the fire from Fort Niagara on the opposite side of the river, but no provocation could induce the American army to leave their places of shelter and venture into the field, where alone I could hope to contend with it successfully. Having made a display of my force in vain, a deliberate ensued without a casualty. I am now satisfied that Fort George is not to be reduced, strengthened and supported as it is by Fort Niagara, without more troops, the co-operation of the fleet and a battering train.³⁶

Boyd reported that in the attack they suffered 5 killed and 27 missing, while enemy lost about 15 killed and 7 captured.³⁷

American confidence on Lake Ontario was increased with the completion about 20 July of the warship General Pike. On 22 July Boyd wrote Chauncey at Sackets Harbor that, with the help of the fleet, a small force might easily capture the British supply depot at the head of the lake, and Chauncey agreed.³⁸ Chauncey proceeded to Niagara and took on board a detachment of men under Colonel Scott.³⁹ The movement of the fleet was severely retarded, however, by calm weather which gave the enemy a chance to prepare for an attack. Although they did land near the entrance to Burlington Bay, the Americans decided that attack was unwise. They then went on to York where they "burnt the

barracks and public stores, and brought off one piece of ordnance (24 pounder) eleven batteaux, and about 400 barrels of flour and hard bread."⁴⁰

At about this time Boyd's restraints were eased somewhat by Armstrong, who now considered American naval strength to be more evenly balanced with the British. Circumstances had changed, he wrote, and with them the restrictions; "it now becomes your business in concert with the fleet, to harrass & destroy the Enemy wherever you can find him."⁴¹ In a second note he added that he had heard that Fort Meigs had been attacked and presumably some of the local British troops under De Rottenburg had been sent to assist Procter. And then he went on to comment:

his late insolence in pushing his small attacks to the very outline of your works has been intended to mask the weakness produced by this Department. If (as you say) you can beat him, do it without delay, & remember that if you beat, you must destroy him. There is no excuse for a general who permits a beaten enemy to escape & to rally.⁴²

Boyd now considered himself "at liberty to act offensively on the arrival of the fleet" and plans were made for a move against the British. A land force would advance towards their camp at the head of the lake while 1,000 men under Brigadier General Williams would be loaded onto boats and take up the shore to cut off any enemy retreat. This, the only offensive contemplated under Boyd, was frustrated when on 7 August, just as the troops were about to board the ships, the British fleet appeared and Chauncey went out to meet it. On the night of the seventh Chauncey lost two schooners which sank in a storm. The two fleets spent most of the next three days jockeying for the most advantageous

position, but neither fired. Neither commander seemed genuinely anxious for a fight. As Chauncey moved away, two schooners accidentally became separated from the rest of the fleet and were easily taken by the British. The Americans had now lost four schooners, the balance had been disturbed, Chauncey returned to Sackets Harbor and the proposed offensive against the British was abandoned.⁴³

The tedium of being cooped up and accomplishing nothing to extend American control in Canada was hard on morale in the camp. Colonel James Preston wrote to the president that it was "very provoking to be thus insolently treated by inferior numbers marching almost in gun shot of our entrenchment, without attempting to repel them by a vigorous onset."⁴⁴ On 3 August Brigadier General Williams warned Armstrong that Boyd was "almost hourly pestered for furloughs."⁴⁵ An examination of the letters written from Fort George to the office of the adjutant general certainly bears this out; most of them concern resignations and requests for furloughs.⁴⁶ Writing in early August, Williams urged Armstrong to "untie" their hands, Boyd took his orders so literally that he would not "offend against the enemy, even for defensive purposes."⁴⁷ After the proposed expedition to the head of the lake was called off, no further offensive operations were planned even though, according to Williams, the skirmishing was achieving nothing and most of the officers favoured attacking.⁴⁸

Nor were living conditions at Fort George designed to produce enthusiasm among the troops. The inspector general at Fort George wrote of the troops in July 1813 that

they are more durty and filthy than any set of Men I have ever seen, in Service, and many of them almost devoured by vermine, there appears to be no care taken by either Officers, or Men in some of the Regiments to

avoid or destroy this insect. Many of the men perhaps from want and very likely from laziness wear their Shirts & pantaloons, without washing until they fall to peaces off their bodies. it would be a desirable thing if the men could be cleansed and those who are destitute of clothing supplied - it would add much to their comfort Pride and appearance as Soldiers.⁴⁹

The ill health and typhoid which had plagued the Americans since the beginning of the campaign did not abate as the summer unfolded. Bad weather aggravated the situation. Most of June and July were unusually cold and rainy, while August and the early weeks in September were hot and oppressive.⁵⁰ Dr. James Mann, chief medical officer at the camp, reported that during August more than a third of both officers and men were sick and that when a number of the doctors fell ill as well, it was difficult to provide adequate care. He considered the situation of the camp basically unhealthy, particularly during the heat spell. The town of Newark obstructed the fresh breezes from the lake, while the forest and the Niagara escarpment cut off the wind coming from the east and the south.⁵¹

Mann analyzed the problems of the typhoid, diarrhoea and dysentery during the summer of 1813 at Fort George. First, many of the men had suffered considerable hardship during the previous winter and had not been in good form when the campaign began. Then, they had been fed bad bread, much of which had been made from flour which was either mouldy or contained plaster of paris. The drinking water was polluted. The greatest evil he considered to be "effluvia from the sinks"; he personally found the stench unbearable, but observed that the men became used to it and

rarely noticed it. This was a problem he felt could have alleviated "by a rigid police, and more thorough covering of the sinks, or by a change of position, a distance of one or two hundred yards." Heat during the day and cold at night produced "unequal excitement," another problem in Mann's eyes. In addition, the state of constant anticipation of attack and frequent skirmishings meant that the soliders did not receive adequate rest. The final problem was inebriation.⁵² Little improvement took place in the health of the troops until more agreeable weather developed late in September.

The summer of 1813 at Fort George was probably unpleasant for virtually everyone in the American camp. The weather was disagreeable, the food unpalatable, many were sick, the British were constantly raiding while the American command could not or would not retaliate, and morale was low. The ordinary soldier must have wondered if his discomfort and frustration were serving any purpose at all. The Americans may have captured Fort George, but the aftermath did not bring control of Upper Canada beyond the immediate surroundings of the fort.

Autumn 1813

While Boyd was moving from skirmish to skirmish at Fort George, a successor to Dearborn was slowly on his way. In early March, Armstrong had ordered General James Wilkinson to assume the rank of major general and proceed from his post at New Orleans to Dearborn's headquarters. Through a series of delays, however, Wilkinson did not even reach Washington until 31 July, by which time Armstrong had named him commander of the Ninth Military District to succeed Dearborn. There then followed a month devoted almost entirely to discussion of the strategy for the fall.

Armstrong looked at the current distribution of forces (3,500 at Forts George and Niagara, 100 at Oswego, 2,000 at Sackets Harbor and 4,000 at Burlington, Vermont)¹ and concluded that they should be concentrated at some point; as they were, none was strong enough to succeed in any worthwhile offensives. He favoured a concentration at Sackets Harbor with a view to the capture of Kingston, a project Dearborn and Chauncey had persuaded him to postpone earlier in the year. One possible alternative would be a move down the St. Lawrence River to join General Hampton's troops from Lake Champlain in an attack on Montreal. In his eyes, a successful offensive against the British at Niagara would result in American control of the peninsula only and this would be rendered even less important if William Henry Harrison defeated Proctor, which in fact he did.²

Wilkinson, on the other hand, favoured a move in the Niagara peninsula to strengthen the American force at Fort

George, "cut up the British force in that quarter, destroy the Indian establishments, and (should General Harrison fail in his objects) march a detachment to capture Malden." This achieved, they could "like lightening" direct their whole force against Kingston. In the meantime, Hampton would have made "a bold feint or provisional attack on Montreal," thus attracting Prevost and the best troops to that place.³

In reply to Wilkinson, Armstrong insisted that Kingston remain the "first and great object of the campaign" and maintained that even a successful operation west of Kingston would only hurt "the tail of the lion." He then presented Wilkinson with two alternatives for the capture of Kingston. If the assembled land and naval forces were up to it, he could stage a direct attack. If they were not, he suggested an indirect route which involved a move down the St. Lawrence to join with Hampton in an attack on Montreal. Success there would isolate the army at Kingston and plunge it into a dilemma. Either it could try to fight its way to Quebec and "perish in the attempt," or it could surrender.⁴

Wilkinson left Washington in mid-August for the northern frontier. He arrived at Sackets Harbor on 20 August and planned to proceed shortly to Fort George, whither, with any luck, Prevost would follow him.⁵ Hoping to create the impression in the British camp that he intended "to cut up De Rottenburg and Vincent," he advised Boyd to make preparations which would appear to be directed to this end. These would in fact be calculated to speed his own "sudden departure from Fort George and rapid descent of the lake with his whole force."⁶

Before leaving Sackets Harbor, Wilkinson called a council of war composed of Chauncey and the principal military officers at the post. These men considered the possible alternatives and approved the indirect plan suggested by Armstrong.⁷ Wilkinson wrote Armstrong in a

confident tone:

the enemy having determined to change his system of operations, from defence to offence, is assembling his whole disposable force at the head of the lake, to attack Fort George; thus placing himself at too great a distance from Montreal to give seasonable succor to that city: he certainly presumes on our imbecility, and we as certainly should take advantage of his presumption.⁸

Wilkinson was soon disabused of his notion that the British were concentrating at Fort George. Armstrong, anxious to be at the scene of the action, transferred his headquarters to Sackets Harbor in early September and wrote Wilkinson on his arrival that Prevost had returned to Kingston.⁹

Characterized by Scott as an "unprincipled imbecile,"¹⁰ Wilkinson arrived at Fort George on 4 September to gather the troops and arrange for their transportation to Sackets Harbor. According to his own account, he found "a sickly camp, undisciplined troops, disorganized corps, a destitution of transport, and a defective quarter-master's department."¹¹ Wilkinson himself was ill and the local command remained with Boyd. Although preparations were begun for the move down the lake, Wilkinson does not seem to have entirely abandoned his idea of a campaign in the Niagara peninsula. The present situation at the fort he termed a "useless occupancy," but he conceded that to secure the fort properly would require a force whose absence would be a "serious drain" from their best troops. He pointed out to Armstrong, however, that they counted "4,600 on paper, and could show about 3,400 combatants." The British, he thought, had about 3,000 men on paper, of whom 1,400 were sick. "Shall I make a sweep of them or not, at the hazard

of our main object?" he asked on 16 September.¹² On 18 September he again wrote Armstrong: "Shall I have the enemy within four miles of this place, making a wide investiture of it from Queenstown to Four Mile creek; or shall I break him up?"¹³

Armstrong was no more enthusiastic about a campaign on the Niagara than he had ever been. He wrote Wilkinson again on 18 September about "the great objects of the campaign"¹⁴ and on the twenty-second sent a more detailed discussion of why they should not attack. If the main body of British troops were at Niagara and not at Kingston, the time was ideal for a capture of the latter place and with it would fall "the whole of the Upper Province westward of the mouth of the St. Lawrence, with all the British force it contains, naval or military." Besides, a victory at Niagara would be "limited in its effects to the ground on which it occurs." In any case, Armstrong did not think Wilkinson would necessarily win if he attacked the British. Even if De Rottenburg were an "ignorant and unprincipled blockhead," he would not allow his troops "to be cut up and captured en masse...without inflicting blows nearly as numerous and fatal as those he received." He might fight just "enough to preserve the morale of his own troops" while drawing the Americans into the mountains, where Wilkinson would have the choice of a battle or retreat.¹⁵

By 20 September, however, Wilkinson seems to have changed his mind. On that date was held a council of war with Wilkinson and 22 of the officers present. At that time Wilkinson announced that "the concentration of the force at this place and Sacket's Harbor, and the reduction of Kingston, comprise [the] chief objects for the operations of the army pending the residence of this campaign." As soon as possible, the main body of the troops would be transferred to Sackets Harbor in preparation for this.

Wilkinson then posed the following questions to the council:
 "1st. - Shall this post be strengthened and garrisoned for defence against the British division in its vicinity? or
 2nd. - Shall the place be razed and abandoned?" With one dissenting vote, the council voted for the second alternative.¹⁶

On the same day Wilkinson wrote Armstrong that he was finally well again and ready for the "herculean task to extract order from chaos." About Fort George, it was his view that "this place neither stops a gap, extends our possessions, nor covers or protects a country; - it is good for naught but to command the ground it occupies, & therefore, I shall dismantle & abandon it."¹⁷

While he had rejected any thought of a campaign in the Niagara, Armstrong was not prepared to abandon Fort George entirely. He now told Wilkinson that

Fort George is to be retained, for, besides depriving the enemy of a convenient harbor, its character and position will furnish useful means for checking any attempts made by the enemy on our frontier. Flank movements including the passage of a river like the Niagara, with a hostile fortress on each side of it, cannot be made but at great risk. My letter will give you the extent of the regular force to be left in the fort, and do not forget that our old friend, Moses Porter, is to succeed you in the command of the fort and its dependencies.¹⁸

It was not until 2 October that the troops destined for Sackets Harbor left. Orders were issued to assemble the baggage and repair and prepare the boats, many of which had been left on the beach all summer and needed caulking. The corps and detachments ordered to embark were "not to leave a

man behind capable of pushing a bayonet."¹⁹

The preparations for sailing were complicated by bad weather and the difficulty of arranging for a naval escort. On 25 September 1,500 men were embarked but were prevented from leaving by high winds.²⁰ Chauncey arrived on the twenty-fourth, but sailed in search of Sir James Yeo and the British fleet on the twenty-seventh. After a small engagement, he returned to Niagara on 1 October.

On that day, however, the troops had begun to move down the lake without naval assistance. High winds developed once again and, although the bateaux continued in use, some of the schooners returned. Wilkinson himself sailed with the rest of the boats on 2 October, having embarked about 3,500 men. He left at Fort George 800 regulars and 690 militia under Scott.²¹

During the winter of 1815, Wilkinson was subjected to a court martial and charged, along with misconduct during the St. Lawrence campaign during the fall of 1813, with "unnecessarily delaying, and retarding the movement of the troops, under his command at Fort George, from that post to Henderson's bay or Sacket's Harbor." According to the testimony of a number of witnesses who were present at the time, Wilkinson appeared not to have been the cause of the delay and, as in the other courts martial of which he had been the subject, was found not guilty on all counts.²²

As he was departing, Wilkinson obeyed Armstrong's orders only in part. He did not abandon Fort George as he had threatened to do and he did leave a detachment of regulars there. He did not, however, leave Moses Porter in command as he had been instructed to do. Instead he left the command of the frontier of New York between Fort Niagara and Buffalo to Brigadier General George McClure of the New York militia and that of Fort George and its dependencies to Scott of the 2nd Artillery.²³ McClure had been ordered to

the Niagara frontier by Governor Tompkins of that state and had arrived there late in September. Wilkinson also ignored instructions to remove Captain Leonard from the command at Fort Niagara.²⁴ This omission was to have serious consequences for the forces within its walls in mid-December.

As it turned out, Fort George was only under Scott's command for a little over a week. De Rottenburg learned of the departure of Wilkinson and the troops shortly after it occurred, withdrew the greater part of his troops from Niagara and began the trip to Kingston. Scott was greatly disturbed by this development and wrote to Wilkinson on 11 October that

the enemy has treated me with neglect. He continued in his old positions until Saturday last (the 9th) when he took up his retreat on Burlington heights, and has abandoned this whole peninsula. Two causes are assigned for this precipitate movement; the succour of Proctor, who is reported to be entirely defeated, if not taken; the other, the safety of Kingston, endangered by your movement....My situation has become truly insupportable: without the possibility of an attack at this post, and without the possibility of reaching you time enough to share in the glory of impending operations below;....I propose taking up my line of march on the morning of the 13th....²⁵

The week of Scott's command appears to have been a busy one at the fort. On 5 October the British commander sent a message demanding the surrender of the fort, but Scott declined to cooperate.²⁶ The sixth was spent in skirmishes with the British. The major effort during the first week of

October was devoted to improving the fortifications at the fort. Scott recalled in his Memoirs that Fort George was "enlarged, in part, by him, according to a plan of the engineer, Captain Totten. Great care was taken by both not to disturb the bastion in which the remains of General Brock lay interred."²⁷ Writing of himself in the third person, he noted that when he entered the command,

one entire side of the fort - then under-going an extension - was still perfectly open. The enemy - remaining in undiminished force, within five miles, and whom Wilkinson had declined to attack - could not be ignorant of the weakness of Scott's position. An early assault seemed, therefore, inevitable. Each officer (including the commander) and men worked upon the defences from fourteen to twenty hours a day. By the fourth night, however, so great had been the progress of these labors, that all became anxious for an attack.²⁸

As we have seen, these hopes were not to be fulfilled and Scott left on 13 October. When he left, he felt that Fort George, as a field work, might be considered as complete....It was garnished with ten pieces of artillery (which number might easily have been increased from the spare ordnance at the opposite Fort) with an ample supply of fixed ammunition, etc. etc. etc.²⁹

According to Scott, he improved the fortification according to the plan of the engineer Totten. If this plan were in the form of a map or drawing, it does not seem to have survived. We do, however, have some of Totten's ideas on what ought to be done. He wrote a note to Boyd on 7

August 1813.

In a communication made by me to Gen Van Renssellar the last fall, it was recommended that, with the exception of some repairs of the interior of Fort Niagara our works should be offensive - calculated to protect the passage of troops; &, at this extremity of the Frontier, for the further object of destroying the defences of Fort George. And that, in the event of the reduction of the latter Fort, its land points should be strengthened, & the parapets or epaulements fronting our shores be razed, making thereby a secure lodgement against any attack the enemy could direct against it, & receiving our retreat should misfortunes in Canada such a movement necessary. Since that communication was made, I have fortunately been enabled to examine the shore we now occupy, with all the works constructed by the English, by a nearer view, & can find no reason in my own mind why the plan then suggested should not now be pursued. To take the privilege you have given me, and enter upon the details of my plan, I beg leave to recommend that the land defences of Fort George be first strengthened by completing the works already in such a state of forwardness - that the mass of earth behind the Barracks be reduced to a musket-proof parapet, that Barracks of wood for a garrison of four or five hundred men, and a magazine also of wood, be built within it - and that such expedients be resorted to for the security of Fort Niagara as may be found convenient and

necessary.³⁰

Unfortunately, we do not have any record of what exactly were the "works already in such a state of forwardness." They probably included changes undertaken by the British before the fort was captured (see Appendix D) and any work begun by the Americans in the first months of their occupancy. The only information comes from general remarks, such as Dr. Mann's comment that the fort was "reduced in its dimensions, and its lines of defence strengthened by a deep ditch and palisades."³¹ Prevost told Bathurst in August that he had come close "to the fort and the new entrenched camp which is formed on the right of that work."³²

The original British fort had been a stockaded structure with six bastions and the Americans left intact the northeast bastion in which Brock had been buried. Their fort, however, was a five-sided structure with earthen curtains and a bastion at each angle. It occupied about one-half of the area of its predecessor (see Figs. 1 and 2). Trenches were constructed, running between the northwest bastion to about the position of the church and then south to the bank of the river (see Fig. 2). This provided the "entrenched camp" referred to by Prevost.

With the departure of Scott, Fort George and the Niagara frontier were left under the command of Brigadier General George McClure of the New York militia. Like many officers in the War of 1812, he had had no military experience. He had come from Bath, New York, where he owned the local distillery and the flour and woollen mills.³³

McClure arrived in the Niagara peninsula during the latter part of September 1813 with about 2,000 men.³⁴ Six hundred of these crossed the river to Fort George to fill the gaps left by Wilkinson's departing forces and the rest were stationed at Fort Niagara, Lewiston, Schlosser and

Black Rock.³⁵ In the latter group were some "cowards, Tories and constitutionalists" who refused to cross the border. With the departure of Wilkinson, McClure considered that his force would be too small to push back a British attack and so he published a florid address to "the Patriots of the Western District." In it he invited those citizens who were prepared to cross the Niagara River to join his brigade for a two-month period during which the "fate of the province of Upper Canada, and the command of the Niagara frontier" would be decided.³⁶ Response to this appeal was disappointing. And some of those who did respond returned home shortly afterward, "being led to believe that their services would not be necessary."³⁷

At the time of Scott's departure, McClure was absent from the fort. Along with 1,200 of his own men, Cyrenius Chapin and 100 volunteers, and P.B. Porter with 400 or 500 of the Indians and volunteers he had raised during September, he had gone out in an effort to "harrass and detain" the British on their retreat.³⁸ They had reached Twelve Mile Creek when they were recalled by Scott. On their return trip, McClure states that they captured a "considerable quantity" of British baggage and stores and "took a circuit through the country, and destroyed their barracks and fortifications, at Chippawa, Queenston Heights, St. David's and Cross Roads." When they reached the fort, Scott had already left.³⁹

McClure's position at Fort George was never a strong one; in late October he calculated that besides his militia he had only about 60 regulars, making a total of about 1,200 effectives on both sides of the river. This weakness was naturally a continuing source of concern to him and he directed a series of letters to both Armstrong and Tompkins pleading for troops, either militia or regulars, to be sent to Fort George because the term of service of his militia

was due to expire in early December. His need became even more urgent when the British began building barracks at Burlington and giving every indication that they intended to winter there. A stronger Fort George he considered imperative "to keep them in check and prevent daily depredations upon our extensive and much exposed border." Recent violence against the local inhabitants, he feared, would "induce the enemy to visit upon our defenceless inhabitants the whole force of their indignation."⁴⁰

McClure's control over his troops appears to have been less than complete. During the first weeks of October it seems that there was considerable "illegal, unauthorized, and forbidden pillage" committed by "a few, who are lost to all honour, and insensible of the obligations of a soldier." McClure addressed the residents of Upper Canada on the subject and urged them to "abstain from communications with the British army and remain at home, quietly pursuing their avocations." Civil magistrates were asked to report incidents of violence committed by American troops. Surprisingly, but truthfully, he admitted that he could not "promise complete security," but promised to attempt to protect the "innocent, the unfortunate and the distressed."⁴¹

The situation for McClure brightened considerably with the arrival at Fort George on 30 October of General William Henry Harrison with about 1,100 men.⁴² After the defeat of Procter at the Battle of the Thames on 5 October, Harrison had returned to Detroit and then proceeded via Buffalo to Fort George where he was quartered in Newark. At Newark Harrison received a letter from Armstrong referring to the head of Burlington Bay as the last stronghold of the British in the peninsula and observing that "the capture or destruction of this corps would be a glorious finale" to his campaign.⁴³ McClure and Harrison planned to undertake this task together, but because they believed British forces to

be greater than their own, Harrison requested McClure to call out more militia or volunteers for a 30-day period.⁴⁴ P.B. Porter and Cyrenius Chapin were also authorized to raise volunteers for the same period.⁴⁵ About 400 men responded to the call, but the proposed action was cancelled the day before it was to take place when Harrison received orders to proceed immediately to Sackets Harbor.⁴⁶

Harrison notified McClure of his orders right away, restored him to the command and directed him to retain the volunteers as long as he considered their services necessary.⁴⁷ A very disappointed McClure pleaded with Harrison to delay his departure until after the move against the British.⁴⁸ Harrison, although he shared McClure's disappointment, felt that his instructions left him with no alternative. Sackets Harbor had been short of men since the troops had left for the St. Lawrence and any delay in reinforcing it could be dangerous. Another consideration was Chauncey's attitude; Chauncey had delivered the orders and was anxious to return before ice blocked the lake.⁴⁹ Harrison and Chauncey sailed on 16 November. McClure wrote that "here commenced a scene of confusion and disorder beyond description, which continued until the discharge of the militia."⁵⁰

The situation at Fort George does, in fact, seem to have degenerated rapidly during the next month. The militia and volunteers who had recently been raised had come only for one month. Those who had come with McClure were free to leave on 9 December. There were only about 60 regulars besides some sick that Harrison had left behind. McClure continued to plead for reinforcements, but by the time arrangements were made, it would be too late.

Shortly after Harrison's departure, McClure sent out a detachment under Colonel Joseph Wilcocks, a former member of the Upper Canadian legislature who during the summer had

formed a corps of "Canadian Volunteers" to assist the Americans. This detachment travelled as far as the British picket at Stoney Creek and reported that the British had 1,200 to 1,500 troops and 900 Indians and were preparing to winter there at Burlington. It would obviously be folly for McClure to attempt "any thing more than desultory excursions," but he was in a difficult position; the troops were threatening to return home unless they saw action soon.⁵¹ On 26 November, to satisfy them and give confidence to the inhabitants that they had possession of the country, McClure and 1,200 or 1,300 men marched out as far as Stoney Creek. Wilcocks reconnoitered further and once again McClure decided that to proceed further would be to invite disaster. At the time he claimed that he had never intended to subject the troops to certain disaster and that in consultation with his officers he had decided to return.⁵² Large numbers of men deserted during the march and by the next morning the American forces had been reduced to about 1,000 men.⁵³ In a later account, McClure claimed that the British were actually advancing toward them and they had had to rush back to the fort which was being manned only by deserters, in case the British were approaching by boat as well.⁵⁴ The only success of the expedition was the capture of over 400 barrels of flour, a commodity which was becoming scarce at Fort George.

Meanwhile McClure was becoming more and more desperate as December approached. He was constantly trying to persuade those who could possibly stay on to do so and even offered a bounty to those who did. In this matter he took the initiative himself, but a representative of the secretary of war approved of his action.⁵⁵ The technique did not work well and in fact some accepted the bounty and then deserted.⁵⁶ On 10 December, McClure wrote, the term of service of the militia had expired and, despite his efforts,

they had "recrossed the river, almost to a man." He attributed the men's refusal to remain in the service to "their having to live in tents at this inclement season, added to that of the pay-master's coming on only prepared to furnish them with one out of three months pay."

After the militia had left, McClure reported that he had only 60 effective regular troops and about 40 volunteers.⁵⁷ By this time Armstrong and Tompkins were authorizing him to call up more troops and take some from another militia division,⁵⁸ but by now it was too late. Word came that the British were approaching and McClure went into a panic. He told later of his reaction.

I summoned a council of the officers, regulars and militia, and put the question, Is Fort George tenable, with our present force? They unanimously decided in the negative. I also laid before them, a letter from General Armstrong, on the subject of the destruction of New-Ark. - They gave it as their opinion, (with one exception) that the town ought to be destroyed; that, laying aside the defence of Fort George, it became absolutely necessary for the defence of Fort Niagara, which lay immediately opposite. It would deprive the enemy of quarters, and being winter, they would not be able to penetrate the earth, or rebuild and fortify themselves at such an inclement season, and consequently, would be compelled to retrace their steps to their garrison at Burlington Heights.⁵⁹

Accordingly, on 10 December McClure ordered Fort George evacuated and directed

all the arms, ammunition and public stores of every description to be sent across the river,

which was principally effected, though the enemy advanced so rapidly that ten of my men were made prisoners, and ordered the town of Newark to be burnt. This act, however distressing to the inhabitants and to my feelings, was by an order of the secretary at war, and I believe at the same time proper. The inhabitants had twelve hours notice to remove their effects and such as chose to come across the river, were provided with all the necessaries of life.⁶⁰

McClure's actions on 10 December did not advance the American cause in any way. He claimed that he was burning Newark in order to deprive the British of any winter quarters. If this were his aim, he was less than efficient. Colonel John Murray, leader of the British forces who occupied the fort, reported to Vincent on 12 December that the cannon and stores have been removed, but the attempt to destroy the fortifications which are evidently so much strengthened whilst in his possession, has failed...the enemy might have maintained a regular siege against the British, but such was his apparent panic that he left the whole of his tents standing.⁶¹

The next day he reported the discovery of seven cannons, and "an immense quantity of shot, with camp equipage for 1500 men." The arsenal had been destroyed, as had the principal magazine, but some temporary magazines were saved.⁶²

McClure maintained that he had ordered Newark burned on the authority of the secretary of war. On 4 October 1813 Armstrong had issued the following instructions to him:

understanding that the defence of the post committed to your charge may render it proper to destroy the town of Newark, you are hereby directed to apprise the inhabitants of this circumstance, and to invite them to remove themselves and their effects to some place of greater safety.⁶³

Armstrong denied emphatically that he had ordered the destruction of the town. Writing to Tompkins of McClure's assumption, he said

this is a great error...my orders were to burn it if necessary to the defence of Fort George not otherwise. But he does not defend fort George and then burns N.A. My orders were given on the report of the General that the attack of Fort George might be covered by Newark.⁶⁴

Tompkins similarly disclaimed any responsibility. He wrote to McClure:

I was not apprised of the intention to evacuate Fort George & destroy Newark, either by the Secretary of War or yourself, otherwise I should most assuredly have given directions to have that frontier supplied with a considerable force to guard against the consequences of the irritation & disposition to retaliate, which the burning of Newark would naturally excite on the west side of the Niagara river.⁶⁵

A "disposition to retaliate" certainly did result from the events of 10 December. McClure wrote Armstrong on the thirteenth that the enemy was "much exasperated" and would "make a descent on this frontier if possible." This alarmed him somewhat, inasmuch as he calculated his total effective

force along the Niagara River at 250 men.⁶⁶

On 13 December McClure left Fort Niagara for Buffalo where he intended to establish his headquarters. His behaviour during the rest of the month suggests that he was out of touch with reality and was trying desperately to convince himself and others that he was at least competent. For example, he told Armstrong on the fifteenth that if the government sent him 2,500 militia or volunteers, 1,000 regulars and enough sleighs to transport them, there would not be a British soldier west of York by the first of February.⁶⁷

On 18 December McClure issued an address to the inhabitants of the surrounding areas calling every man capable of bearing arms to report to Lewiston, Schlosser or Buffalo. He had had word that the British had concentrated their forces and boats at Fort George and intended to attack Fort Niagara the next night.⁶⁸ Fort Niagara was the principal repository for arms and supplies on the frontier, so its defence was of the utmost importance. Although McClure claimed he warned Captain Leonard, who was in charge of the fort, of the impending attack, the detachment at the fort was surprised sleeping. Early in the morning of the nineteenth the fort was attacked and captured by Lieutenant Colonel John Murray and 550 British regulars. The Americans lost 65 killed and 14 wounded while the attackers lost only 6 killed and 5 wounded.⁶⁹ The fort and the stores kept in it remained in British hands until the end of the war. McClure accused Captain Leonard, who was visiting his family at the time of the attack, of collusion with the British.⁷⁰ Even considering Leonard's negligence, McClure came off badly in the affair. The attack on Fort Niagara was followed immediately by attacks on Lewiston, Youngstown, Manchester and the Indian village of Tuscarora. Heavy destruction and much killing accompanied them. McClure was

immediately replaced by Major General Amos Hall, but before Hall had had an opportunity to try to sort things out and improve defence arrangements, the British burned Black Rock and Buffalo.

After an encouraging beginning to the campaign for the Americans, the end of the year 1813 saw the British not only in control of Fort George, but also of Fort Niagara. The whole Niagara frontier was in a shambles. The campaign on the St. Lawrence had been a disaster as well. An unknown American soldier no doubt echoed the thoughts of many of his countrymen when he wrote that "our soldiers can beat their soldiers in fighting, but their generals beat ours in management."⁷¹

1814

The year 1814 saw much action in the Niagara peninsula, but little actually at Fort George. In late February Armstrong sent two orders to General Jacob Brown at Sackets Harbor. One instructed him to take 2,000 men and join with Chauncey in an attack on Kingston. The second ordered him to Niagara for action there. It appeared later that Armstrong had intended his first directive to be obeyed and that his second was "merely a mask for the operation against Kingston."¹ Chauncey and Brown considered their forces too weak for a successful expedition against Kingston, however, and Brown transferred his troops to Buffalo. When he heard of this, Armstrong wrote him to "go on and prosper. Good consequences are sometimes the result of mistakes."²

On 7 June 1814, the American cabinet approved plans for an invasion of Canada through the Niagara peninsula. Armstrong immediately wrote Brown of ambitious plans to take Burlington Heights and gain control of the whole Niagara region, but added that they would have to wait until Chauncey had gained command of Lake Ontario. To give "immediate occupation" to Brown's troops, however, he suggested that he capture Fort Erie and proceed in the direction of Fort George. The British would find it necessary to keep a certain number of men at that fort and at Fort Niagara. Armstrong therefore believed that the largest force they could field to meet the invaders would number about 1,600. "With these," he wrote "you should not decline a contest. A successful one, on our part, will

enable you to invest Fort George & to avail yourself, in the most direct way, of Commodore Chauncey's aid (should he beat you) in reducing that place & Fort Niagara." ³

Brown agreed with Armstrong on the general plan of attack. ⁴ He sent word to Chauncey of his intention to begin the campaign about 1 July and asked Chauncey to inform him by express if he could expect to meet him near Fort George about 10 July. If Chauncey were coming, Brown asked him to bring along two 18-pounders and a rifle corps, if it could be spared. ⁵

Chauncey's reply was noncommittal. He intended to "offer" battle to Sir James Yeo during the first week in July and if all went well he would be able to cooperate with Brown. If Yeo declined his invitation to fight, Chauncey felt he would have to "watch his movements to prevent his doing mischief." ⁶

Brown's campaign started out in a manner most satisfying to the Americans. Accompanied by two brigades of regulars under Winfield Scott and E.W. Ripley and a brigade of militia and Indians under Peter B. Porter, he easily took Fort Erie on 3 July. On the same day Major General Phineas Riall marched out with a force from Fort George. He clashed with Brown at the Battle of Chippawa on the fifth, after which he was forced to retreat to Fort George. Brown's forces then advanced and camped on the heights at Queenston, where he had hoped to meet Chauncey. When he had heard nothing from him by 15 July, he wrote to him:

meet me on the lake shore north of Fort George with your fleet, and we will be able, I have no doubt, to settle a plan of operations that will break the power of the enemy in Upper Canada, and that in the course of a short time....I do not doubt my ability to meet the enemy in the field, and to march in any

direction over his country - your fleet carrying for me the necessary supplies. We can threaten Forts George and Niagara, carry Burlington Heights and York, and proceed direct to Kingston and carry that place.⁷

In the meantime Brown was busy assessing his situation. On 13 July a reconnaissance expedition of 120 volunteers advanced close to Fort George and captured a British picket. The only casualty was the death of its leader, Brigadier General John Swift. On the fifteenth Peter B. Porter, with Major Eleazer Wood of the Engineers, led his brigade to within a mile of the fort. Here Wood spent an hour and a half examining the fort,⁸ but unfortunately no record seems to have survived of his findings. More reconnaissance expeditions were sent out on 20 and 21 July.⁹ On the twentieth, Brown advanced with his troops and camped close to the rear of Fort George, but the British did not come out to meet them. Brown told Armstrong that

the Heights were abandoned to the Enemy, and we did hope that the movement would have induced him to occupy them, or close in, nearer to us, so as to bring on an Engagement out of his works. In this we were disappointed.¹⁰

On 23 July the American troops withdrew to Queenston.

Brown received word on 23 July that Chauncey had not left Sackets Harbor, that he was "confined to his bed with a fever" and that it was not known when the fleet would sail or when the guns and forces he had requested would leave Sackets Harbor.¹¹ Brown felt that alone he was too weak to attack Fort George, which he believed to have been reinforced from Burlington, York, Kingston and Prescott. On the twenty-fourth he fell back to Chippawa. The British now advanced from Fort George and met the Americans in the Battle of Lundy's Lane on 25 July. At the end of a day of

hard fighting and heavy casualties it was not clear which side could claim victory. In effect, however, it was the British who won. They were receiving reinforcements while the exhausted Americans were not. The next day the Americans withdrew to Fort Erie.¹²

The remainder of the season of 1814 saw considerable activity around Fort Erie, but no further conflict occurred near or at Fort George. The focus of attention of both sides had generally shifted away from the Niagara peninsula to the Lake Champlain region, the Chesapeake Bay and Washington area, and the South. The War of 1812 ended with the Treaty of Ghent, signed 24 December 1814, by which the Americans and the British agreed to return to the status quo ante bellum.

Conclusions

When the war against Britain was declared in July 1812, its supporters considered an American conquest of Canada both desirable and attainable. Victory, however, turned out to be an elusive commodity. The organization of an efficient army was a difficult task in a nation which had not seen military action since the revolutionary war. Most of the experienced officers were no longer young and quick, and it took some time for new talent to surface.

The season of 1812 along the northern frontier was a failure in every respect. At Niagara an unpractised general received little help and guidance from an incompetent secretary of war and a confused and disorganized commander. Weakened by the unwillingness of a regular officer to cooperate with one from the militia and pressed for action by inexperienced and undisciplined troops, he nonetheless led his men across the Niagara River in October 1812. The engagement which followed, the Battle of Queenston Heights, was a complete fiasco for the Americans.

The 1813 season opened in a much more acceptable manner with the capture of York and then, on 27 May, that of Fort George. Victory was short-lived, however. The British garrison which had occupied Fort George was allowed to escape by the American commander. Just as a pursuit was being launched and in spite of the enthusiasm of those involved in it, he ordered the troops to return to the fort and resume the chase the next day. By then, however, it was too late and the Americans spent a miserable summer cooped

up in Fort George by the forces they had failed to capture.

In July the aging and sickly General Dearborn was replaced temporarily by Brigadier General John Boyd who was regarded as a nonentity by most of those on the scene. During much of his tenure his hands were bound by the secretary of war who instructed him to engage only in defensive activities. By the time he was freed to institute some offensive operations, at least with the cooperation of the fleet, Chauncey was occupied elsewhere. General Wilkinson, Dearborn's successor, was at Fort George for only a month, during most of which time he was ill. In any case, his instructions from Secretary Armstrong were to move the troops to Sackets Harbor as a prelude to a move against Montreal. Colonel Winfield Scott, whom he left in command, was a competent and energetic young officer, but he remained only a week and a half. Now the fort fell under the command of General George McClure of the New York Militia. His forces were inadequate and inexperienced, his appeals to the citizenry of northeastern New York fell largely on deaf ears and his pleas for support from Armstrong and Governor Tompkins were ignored until it was too late. When the British approached, McClure panicked, burned Newark and abandoned Fort George and some of its contents to the enemy. His actions brought swift retaliation; by the end of the year 1813 Fort Niagara was also in British hands and the entire Niagara frontier had been laid waste.

By 1814 more competent leadership had risen to the top and the troops under Brown were much better trained than had been previous forces. Brown, however, was thwarted in his plan to retake Fort George when the cautious Chauncey failed to meet him there with the necessary ordnance and extra troops. By the Treaty of Ghent of Christmas Eve, 1814, both sides returned to the status quo ante bellum.

Fort George was considered by the American authorities

during the three seasons of the war as a possible initial step in the control of Upper Canada. Poor overall management doomed the attempts of 1812 and 1814. The 1813 attack was successful only in that the fort was captured and the Americans controlled both sides of the Niagara River long enough to move ships into Lake Erie. Beyond that, the occupation of the fort served little purpose. The British forces were able to confine the Americans to the fort and no territorial gains were made as a result of its possession. For American purposes, General Wilkinson was correct when he assessed the situation in September 1813. Fort George in fact commanded only the ground it occupied, neither stopping a gap, extending their possessions, nor protecting a country.

Capture of Fort George had been anticipated by the Americans as an important foothold from which to extend their control through Upper Canada. In the end it proved to be a source of frustration and disappointment, and the circumstances of their retreat from it resulted in heavy destruction and loss of life within their own borders.

Appendix A. Scott's Orders, 25 May 1813.

Orders.

Adjutant General's Office,
May 25, 1813

A corps of light troops, consisting of 400 infantry, Forsyth's riflemen, the two flank companies of the 15th infantry, also one 3-pounder, to form the advance under Colonel Scott. It is understood that this corps should first effect a landing, scour and possess the shore and cover the landing of the troops which are to follow. The riflemen to advance in front on the flanks or obliquely to the flanks, according to circumstances. It is not understood that Colonel Scott should advance beyond 300 paces before he is supported by the first brigade.

2d.- Boyd's brigade will follow quickly in support to advance in column or display as may best suit the general purposes of the descent. Major Eustis's corps of light artillery to accompany this brigade, and Lieut-Colonel McClure's volunteers will be on its flanks.

3d.- In like manner Winder's brigade will follow in quick succession to advance in column and display on Boyd's left or remain in column, as may be deemed expedient by Major-General Lewis. Captain Towson's company of artillery will accompany this brigade. Major-General Lewis will land with any part of his division.

4th.- Chandler's brigade to constitute the reserve. It is to be embarked as soon as possible. Colonel Macomb with

his artillery will land with the reserve and act as circumstances may require. Brigadier-General Chandler is to detach 100 men to remain at the point of landing as soon as the main line is formed. Colonel Scott, (who will be under the orders of Major-General Lewis), will advance, but not more than 300 paces in front of the infantry. If the enemy appear in force the light troops are to fall back and form on the flanks and act as circumstances may require. The direction of the boats and debarkation of troops will be arranged by Commodore Chauncey. Each brigade will designate and mark its boats.

By command.

W. Scott,

Adjutant General.¹

Appendix B. American Losses at the Capture of Fort George,
27 May 1813.

Return of the loss of the Army of the United States, in
the action of the 27th May, 1813

The light troops under the command of lieutenant-colonel Scott - captain Roach of the 23rd infantry wounded; lieutenant Swearingen, do.; 23 non-commissioned officers and privates killed; 64 do. wounded - total 89.

General Lewis's division - first, or Boyd's brigade, lieutenant H.A. Hobart, killed; rank and file, 1 wounded.

Sixth regiment of infantry, captain Arrowsmith, wounded; rank and file, 6 killed, 16 wounded.

Fifteenth regiment of infantry, major King, wounded; rank and file, 1 killed, 6 wounded.

Sixteenth regiment of infantry, captain Steel, wounded; rank and file, 8 killed, 9 wounded.

New York volunteers, rank and file, 4 wounded.

Second, or Winder's brigade, rank and file, 6 wounded.

Third, or Chandler's brigade, none.

Of the wounded, but 61 have been sent to the hospital. The wounds of the others are very slight.¹

Appendix C. American Account of British Losses at the
Capture of Fort George.

Return of the loss of the enemy in killed, wounded, and
taken, in action of the 27th May, 1813.

Killed - 108

Prisoners - wounded, 1 colonel, 3 subalterns, 7
serjeants, and 152 rank and file - 163. Not wounded - 1
captain, 1 subaltern, 1 surgeon, 8 serjeants, and 102 rank
and file - 115.

Total loss of the enemy, 386 - Militia paroled - 507.

E. Beebe, Asst Adjt.-General.¹

Appendix D. Analysis of a "Plan of the English Fort George," signed by C. Van Deventer, in the National Archives of the United States.

The only map in the National Archives of the United States which shows Fort George in any detail is an undated map signed by C. Van Deventer.¹ It seems likely that this plan was drawn some time during the summer of 1812.

Christopher Van Deventer of New York State studied at the United States Military Academy at West Point in 1808 and 1809.² On 9 January 1809 he graduated and was appointed second lieutenant in the First Regiment of Artillerists. Between 1809 and 1812 he served at various Atlantic posts with at least one visit to Fort Niagara in July 1811.³ On 12 March 1812 he was promoted to first lieutenant. During most of 1812 he was involved in staff duties in New York harbour. In 1812 Van Deventer also seems to have become part of the quartermaster general's department. On 10 July 1812 the secretary of war wrote to him.

You are hereby appointed an assistant Deputy Quarter Master General conformably to the Act of July 6th, 1812. In the discharge of the Duties of this appointment, you will be governed by the Constructions conformably to your appointment of April 28th, as Assistant Deputy Quarter Master.⁴

The secretary of war addressed letters to Van Deventer at New York on 23 and 26 September 1812 and 18 November 1812.⁵ All of these letters concerned supplies or pay and contained

no mention of Niagara. On 26 May 1813 he was appointed a major, deputy quartermaster general.

Although none of the correspondence extant indicates that Van Deventer was on the Niagara frontier during 1812, he must have made a flying visit to the region. On 28 June 1812 he was ordered to prepare a report describing the terrain, fortifications and armament of Fort George. Amos Stoddard also wanted to know where an invading army could land.⁶ In the report Van Deventer made, he discarded the possibility of crossing between Lewiston and Queenston because the current was strong and Queenston was defended.⁷ He did not mention that this crossing had been made with disastrous results - the Battle of Queenston Heights. Thus it seems reasonable to deduce that Van Deventer's report was prepared some time between 28 June 1812 and 13 October 1812, when the Americans attempted the crossing at Queenston.

During the winter of 1813 Van Deventer wrote several letters to the secretary of war about his assignment to arrange for the construction of a number of boats at Sackets Harbor.⁸ In March he moved to that place where he remained until he went to Buffalo in late April.⁹ He was present at the taking of Fort George on 27 May 1813 and wrote from that fort on 1 June a letter to the secretary of war.¹⁰

Van Deventer was captured by the British at Stoney Creek on 6 June 1813. For the remainder of 1813 and 1814 he was imprisoned at Quebec. He apparently escaped at some point during 1814, but was recaptured on the Maine border.

After the war Van Deventer resumed his work on the fortifications in New York harbour. He resigned on 30 August 1816, and from 1817 to 1827 was chief clerk of the United States War Department. He died on 22 April 1838, at Georgetown, D.C.

The fort shown on Van Deventer's map resembles that illustrated by the plan of 1814 (see Figs. 3 and 4) which

includes alterations made by the Americans during their occupation. As the plan is entitled "Plan of the English Fort George" and it is likely that it was prepared during the summer of 1812, it probably shows the general outline and layout of the fort as it was when captured by the Americans in 1813. It demonstrates, therefore, that the Americans in their alterations to the fort followed closely the reformation which the British had begun the previous year.

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1812

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1814

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Appendix A

- 1 Ernest Alexander Cruikshank, ed., Documentary History, Vol. 6, pp. 107-8.

Appendix B

- 1 The Historical Register of the United States, op. cit., pp. 229-30.

Appendix C

- 1 The Historical Register of the United States, op. cit., p. 230.

Appendix D

- 1 The plan is in USNA, RG77/b/DR 113-5-1/2.
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 - 5 Ibid., Vol. 6, p. 163, secretary of war to Van Deventer, 26 Sept. 1812; *ibid.*, p. 201, secretary of war to Van Deventer, 18 Nov. 1812.
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 - 9 Ibid., V27, Van Deventer to secretary of war, 27 April 1813, from Buffalo.
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
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
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


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


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4 Plan of Fort George dated June 1814. (Public Archives of Canada.)



The Guardhouse at
Fort George, Ontario,
by Elizabeth Vincent

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Abstract

The guardhouse at Fort George, Ontario, was built between 1798 and 1800. It contained two guardrooms and four cells. The continuous use of these cells was claimed to be one of the causes of the mutiny at Fort George in 1803. During the War of 1812 it was burnt. The few available references to this building, archaeological evidence and a comparative study of other guardhouses of the period have been used to show what this guardhouse probably was like.

Submitted for publication 1973, by Elizabeth Vincent,
National Historic Parks and Sites Branch, Ottawa.

Abrégé

Le corps de garde du fort George, en Ontario, a été construit entre 1798 et 1800, à la suite de l'abandon du fort Niagara par les Britanniques aux termes du traité de Jay, signé en 1796. Les Britanniques ont bâti le nouveau fort sur la rive ouest de la rivière Niagara, à environ un mille au sud du lac Ontario, pour s'assurer d'une position stratégique dans la région.

Le corps de garde, construction de bois reposant sur une fondation en moëllons, mesurait environ 28 pieds de large sur 49 de long. Il était doté d'un comble en croupe et d'une galerie le long du mur est. Il abritait le corps de garde des officiers et celui des simples soldats, ainsi que quatre cellules. Ces dernières ont probablement été construites sans source de chaleur ni de lumière.

L'usage continu des cellules du corps de garde fut l'une des principales causes du mécontentement des soldats qui fit naître une conspiration de mutinerie au fort George, au cours de l'été 1803. La mutinerie fut réprimée, et les mutins exécutés ou déportés.

Le corps de garde fut détruit au cours de la guerre de 1812. Les bâtiments de bois subirent de lourds dommages sous un bombardement nourri des Américains, et au moment où ces derniers capturèrent le fort, en mai 1813, la totalité des casernes en bois rond et probablement tous les autres bâtiments de bois, dont le corps de garde, avaient été ravagés.

L'auteur a essayé d'illustrer le corps de garde du fort

George en se fondant sur les rares documents contemporains concernant le bâtiment, et sur des découvertes archéologiques faites au cours de fouilles sur les lieux par M. J.P. Wilson, alors archéologue à la Direction des lieux et parcs historiques nationaux du ministère des Affaires indiennes et du Nord, ainsi que sur la comparaison avec d'autres corps de garde de l'époque, tirant surtout ses renseignements du rapport rédigé dans les années 1820 par le lieutenant-colonel E.W. Durnford.

Introduction

The present guardhouse at Fort George was built as part of the reconstruction of the fort in the late 1930s. Due to many factors it is an inaccurate reconstruction. Since the building is in need of substantial repairs as well, it is planned to replace it as soon as feasible by a more accurate reconstruction which will then be furnished to show the guardhouse as it would have been at the time of the War of 1812. For that purpose, research on the guardhouse at Fort George and comparative work on other guardhouses of the period were necessary.

Unfortunately we have not found any plans for the guardhouse at Fort George. Captain Pilkington, Commanding Engineer at Fort George at the time the guardhouse was built, was to have been given instructions about the building of the guardhouse along with the estimate, but no copy of these instructions seems to have survived. It is possible that these instructions would be of little help even if we had them. Colonel Landmann recalls in his Adventures and Recollections that when he was ordered to St. Joseph's he received some general instructions and two estimates, but no plans, sections or even descriptions of the buildings he was to erect.¹ We have one picture of the interior of Fort George which shows the guardhouse in the distance, but the details are not very clear. Bruyères mentioned the guardhouse in his report in 1802, but gives very little detail about it. This lack of information makes it necessary to study carefully every reference to the

guardhouse at Fort George and also to seek information about other guardhouses of the period in order to see what features were common to all guardhouses.

General History of the Guardhouse

The Building of Fort George

In 1794, with the signing of Jay's Treaty, Britain accepted the necessity of withdrawing from the posts which, according to the treaty of 1783, were within the territory of the United States. Among these posts was Fort Niagara, on the east bank of the Niagara River, where it entered Lake Ontario.

There were already some government buildings on the west bank of the river, at Navy Hall - a term which seems to have described a collection of buildings used for various purposes, including probably the first Parliament of Upper Canada. As was often the case when British posts had to be given up to the Americans, everything was left to the last possible minute. As late as June 1795, estimates were being forwarded for repairs to be carried out at Fort Niagara.¹ The 5th Regiment, which had been stationed at Fort Niagara at the time of the signing of Jay's Treaty, was removed from there and sent to Kingston early in the summer of 1796. Some of the Queen's Rangers were stationed at Navy Hall, occupied mainly in fatigue duties. In late June 1796 a detachment of Royal Artillery removed ordnance and ordnance stores "from the Garrison of Niagara to Navy Hall."² At about the same time artificers were busy blowing up stones at Niagara, presumably for the foundations of the new blockhouse which was to be built on the hill behind Navy Hall.³ In December 1796 General Prescott gave the name Fort George to the new post at Niagara.⁴

Building the Guardhouse

The first mention of any type of guardhouse or guardroom at the new post appears in a return of the state of barrack furniture at various posts, dated 12 August 1797.⁵

According to this, Fort George had three rooms for the guard. These guardrooms must have been in one of the blockhouses on the hill (two more had been built in the summer of 1797) or in one of the old buildings at Navy Hall for in a report on accommodations for the troops at Fort George, Gother Mann, the commanding engineer, noted the need for a hospital, guardhouse and artillery store as being particularly pressing.⁶ Estimates for the guardhouse were drawn up and approved and Colonel Mann gave the necessary instructions to Captain Pilkington, the engineer at Fort George. Some time between 1798 and 1800 the guardhouse was built. Work was delayed somewhat owing to the illness of the troops and the resulting necessity of using civilian labour, a much more costly process than building by military labour. According to Colonel Landmann, an engineer who was in Canada at this period, the troops at Fort George were so affected by ague that during one of the summers he was in Canada "a garrison amounting to three or four hundred men could scarcely muster fifty men fit for duty."⁷ In October 1798 the expenditure of a further sum of £100 necessary to complete the officers' quarters, guardhouse, etc. at Fort George was approved.⁸

Functions of the Guardhouse

Why did Colonel Mann consider a guardhouse necessary for Fort George? There were apparently some rooms, somewhere, allocated for the guard. But almost every fort, when it was built, had a separate guardhouse, which served a dual purpose. It provided accommodation for the members of the

guard who were not on sentry duty and it served as a place to lodge prisoners under guard. In larger posts there was often a completely separate building or portion of a building set aside for cells and a general detention area, but at smaller posts guard and prisoners were usually in the same building. The barrack regulations set out special allowances of fuel and candles for guardrooms and places of solitary confinement. Guardrooms received fuel only during winter months, but candles all year long. A guardhouse would contain quarters for the soldiers on guard and quarters for the officer of the day, whose duty was to take charge of the guard, visit all the barracks, collect reports, act as witness for such events as the delivery of presents to the Indians, and take note of and report any disorderly or irregular conduct. A military post would also have a detention area consisting of one or more solitary cells which, particularly in smaller posts, was often part of the guardhouse. Later cell blocks had a defaulters' room, a general lockup room for those guilty of minor infractions of military discipline, as well as cells for solitary confinement. In some posts the orderly room, or office for the adjutant and regimental clerks, was also in the guardhouse or part of the guardroom area. The men of the guard provided sentries for the gates and other important positions such as the powder magazine, and could be called out at any time to defend or control the fort, depending upon whether the anticipated danger was from outside the fort or from within. Both officer and men were supposed to be on duty and it was much easier to ensure that they were on duty and ready for any eventuality in a separate building, or part of a building, fitted out for the purpose.

The Guardhouse Completed

The main guardhouse at Fort George was completed probably early in 1799, but certainly before the fall of 1800. A report on the appropriation of space at Fort George for the troops and various departments, dated 25 September 1800, states that there were two rooms used as guardrooms, the numbers on the doors being 15 and 16, with a marginal note "a new building."⁹ In early 1800 the building of a small guardhouse at Navy Hall was also authorized.¹⁰ A separate establishment for the guard there as well as within Fort George was presumably considered necessary.

Once the guardhouse was built, very little mention is made of it again. It seems to have needed few repairs. In the fall of 1800 Louis LeCoulteulx was confined in the officer's guardroom until he could be sent down to Kingston. LeCoulteulx was a naturalized American who was said to be on his way to Detroit to trade with the Indians, but he had left France after the period specified by the Alien Act and it was suspected by the British authorities, who had warned the commanding officer at Fort George more than a year before to be on the lookout for him, that he was an agent of the French government.¹¹ Bruyères in his 1802 report on the posts in Upper Canada mentioned the guardhouse among the other buildings at Fort George, but did not indicate that it needed any repairs (see Appendix C). Neither those who were confined to it nor those who were on duty in it bothered to describe the guardhouse, probably because during their service in the army they had seen so many others so very much the same. But at the time of the threatened mutiny at Fort George, the guardhouse achieved a certain importance; in fact the use, or overuse, made of it is sometimes given as one of the major causes of the men's discontent.

The Mutiny

On 26 May 1803 the detachment of the 41st Regiment at Fort George was relieved by a detachment of the 49th Regiment under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Roger Hale Sheaffe. As was the case with most units, the 49th soon began to have problems with desertions. On 31 May Lieutenant Colonel Brock, the commanding officer of the 49th, arrived at Fort George in pursuit of several men who had deserted from York. Two days later Sheaffe reported to Lieutenant General Hunter that the deserters from York were secured in the guardhouse at Fort George.¹²

Desertion was always easier for the men if they were aided by some of those on guard and for that reason desertion while on guard duty was regarded as a particularly heinous crime. On 13 August Sheaffe wrote to Green, Hunter's military secretary, reporting the desertion of a corporal and seven privates of the 49th Regiment early on the morning of the 7th. Several of these men, including the corporal, had deserted off guard and one had deserted while a sentry. The deserters were taken by a group of Indians on the American side and were brought back to Fort George and lodged in the guardhouse there.¹³

While these eight men were confined in the guardhouse, the situation at Fort George grew worse. Brock, once again at York, received word from Sheaffe that a dangerous conspiracy existed in the garrison at Fort George. Before Sheaffe had become aware of the conspiracy he had, at Brock's request, sent to York a man named Arthur Wade, who when questioned revealed many details of what was being planned. Brock immediately set out for Fort George. According to one account, he walked to the fort from his landing place and entered by the east gate, whereupon the sentry at that gate called out the guard. Brock then walked across the square to the guardhouse and arrested the

sergeant and corporal of the guard. The drummer was then ordered to beat to arms. The first person to emerge from the officers' quarters, the nearest building to the guardhouse, was Lieutenant Williams, whom Brock ordered to arrest Private John Rock, the prime instigator of the mutiny. Other arrests were made and the mutineers, along with the deserters who were already in the guardhouse cells, were sent to York in the boat which had brought Brock to Fort George as he thought it imprudent to keep them at Fort George any longer.¹⁴ Along with his first report of the happenings at Fort George, Brock included a copy of the information given by a private of the regiment on the subject. The author of this is not given, but it was probably John Daly, who, along with Wade, was promised a discharge in return for testimony at the court martial.¹⁵ According to this statement, the main plan of the conspirators was to spike the field pieces, seize the officers and confine them to their quarters, proceed "to severity with Lieut. Col. Sheaffe against whom appears their entire Grudge," and then to cross over to the United States. Apparently they had some encouragement from various Americans and earlier deserters from the 49th.¹⁶

It was decided by Hunter that the mutineers and deserters from the 49th should be sent to Quebec for a general court martial as sufficient officers could not be assembled in Upper Canada for that purpose. Sheaffe was to act as prosecuting officer. The 49th was not the only regiment involved in this court martial as men from the 6th and 41st Regiments were tried on separate charges relating to desertions in Lower Canada so that the effect on the troops would be more widespread. The court martial lasted from 3 October 1803 to 3 January 1804. Seven of those tried were executed at Quebec 2 March 1804; the rest of those found guilty were sentenced to be transported. It was felt

that an example had to be made of these men in order to reduce the rate of desertion among troops in Canada.

Causes of the Mutiny

What caused the Fort George mutiny? The prisoners put forward as an excuse for their conduct the harsh and severe treatment they claimed they had received from Sheaffe. According to one account, the men were annoyed by objections made to their visiting the town, by various petty regulations and by the fact that "the four black holes were constantly full."¹⁷ These "black holes" were solitary cells without light. Brock himself felt that Sheaffe's conduct had some influence in causing the conspiracy. He considered that Sheaffe's manner of addressing the men on the slightest irritation was unfortunate, that he tended to reduce noncommissioned officers for errors which Brock considered trifling in view of the fact that they could not be replaced with anyone of greater abilities, and that he was somewhat tiresome in field exercise; in short, while understanding well the duties of his profession, he possessed little knowledge of mankind.¹⁸ However, it would be unfair to blame the mutiny solely on Sheaffe. Even the ringleaders, who had attributed their conduct to Sheaffe's harsh discipline, admitted before they died that this was false.¹⁹

Although the most widely known mutiny, because of the drastic nature of the punishment and because of the charges made against Sheaffe by the prisoners, which were repeated and magnified in later years by his enemies, this was not the only instance of large-scale attempted desertion or threatened mutiny in the Canadas. In July 1803 John Walker and Thomas Higgins were tried by garrison court martial as principal leaders of a combination of 50 soldiers of the 49th Regiment who had taken an oath to desert from the post

of Amherstburg. The plan was discovered by Lieutenant Colonel Vincent, then commanding the post, on the day it was to have been carried into effect. Vincent had asked for a general court martial, but Brock ordered a garrison court martial, a court with less authority to punish, and suggested the men be sent to Fort George. The court martial sentenced them to several hundred lashes each, but the punishment was remitted on the men's offering to serve in any regiment that Hunter thought proper. However, they seem to have continued in the 49th as Walker is mentioned in 1805 as one of the men complaining about not receiving the second instalment of Copenhagen prize money.²⁰ Shortly after these two men had their sentences remitted, the conspiracy at Fort George was discovered. The treatment of the Fort George conspirators is in sharp contrast to the lenience shown at Amherstburg. Since lenience seemed to have resulted in another attempted mutiny, a dose of severity was tried.

The situation improved for a time, but not permanently. In 1810 Sir James Craig was pressing upon the authorities in London the necessity of having a general officer stationed in Upper Canada. He felt this was particularly urgent because of the extreme misconduct of the 100th Regiment which had lost about 40 men by desertion. In at least two cases plans for large-scale desertion had only been discovered at the last moment.²¹ In August and September of that year five general courts martial were held at Fort George.²² In one of these, the accused, a private in the 100th Regiment, was sentenced to be transported for life.²³ Even on the eve of the battle of Queenston Heights, the commanding officer at Queenston was worried by the highly mutinous state of his detachment. In December 1812 a private of the 49th Regiment was executed at Fort George for desertion to the enemy.²⁴

What happened at Fort George in 1803 was due mainly to

the nature and situation of the regiment. A large proportion of the private soldiers of the 49th was Irish and as one former officer of the regiment said, "all soldiers, particularly Irish, are given to desertion to the American states."²⁵ Brock pointed out the inducements which had been held out to the men to persuade them to desert and cross the border. He felt that the regiment must be removed from a place of such great temptation before the men could be brought back to a sense of their duty.²⁶ Part of the cause of the unrest was undoubtedly boredom. After he took over command at Fort George, Brock set the men to work building a root house, enclosing a garden and erecting a ball court. The latter, he felt, would keep them as much as possible from that "nest of all wickedness," the town of Newark.²⁷ Undoubtedly the men were happier under Brock's command, but whether he too had to make frequent use of the four black holes is not recorded.

After the Mutiny

After the stirring times of 1803 the guardhouse is mentioned very little. In 1804 the chimney and floor needed some type of repairs, but the nature of these is not specified.²⁸

A recruiting party of the New Brunswick Regiment arrived at Fort George in February 1806 with two recruits whom the commanding officer of the fort, Major Grant, discovered to be American deserters. He immediately confined these men to the guardhouse and prepared to return them to the American commander at Fort Niagara. Shortly after, he received a letter from William Dickson, a judge of the Niagara district court, stating that he had been applied to for writs of habeas corpus on their behalf. As soon as Grant received this, he released the men from the guardhouse and had them attested, fearing a civil action against

himself.²⁹ Once the men were attested there was no further attempt by Magistrate Dickson to interfere in the matter. One of these men soon deserted to the United States and the other was put into the guardhouse once again as he was causing trouble. Unfortunately there seems to be no record of whether he was ever turned over to the American authorities.

War of 1812

Outbreak of War

With the outbreak of war in 1812, Fort George was the scene of greatly increased military activity. The need for vigilance among those on guard was even greater than usual because of the ever present danger of attack from across the river. However, the vigilance was not always as great as it should have been. In November 1812 the court martial of a private of the Lincoln Militia, accused of carrying liquor to the sentinels at their posts, was held at Niagara. He had come out of the guardhouse, gone to the bastion where the 24 pounder was mounted, then gone towards the sentinel at the gate. His defence was that the sentinel at the bastion had given him the liquor and asked him to take it to the sentinel at the main gate. In wartime as in peace, soldiers sought relief in alcohol from the monotony of their life.

The guardhouse itself changed slightly in function. There would always be offenders from the regular garrison though the excitements of war lessened their numbers somewhat, but the guardhouse was also used to confine militia and civilian prisoners.

A report of the main guard at Fort George, 7 September

1812, lists all the prisoners, where confined and on what charge. There were 14 prisoners, civilians and militia, confined in the guardroom, all for refusing to take the oath of allegiance. The guard consisted of 1 subaltern, 3 noncommissioned officers, a drummer and 15 privates, with 5 sentries during the day and 7 at night. The report mentions that the stove pan in the officer's guardroom was broken as was one pane of glass in the men's guardroom.³⁰ Even during the hectic days of war a proper account of all the barrack stores had to be kept.

Destruction of the Guardhouse

The fort was bombarded several times from Fort Niagara. As the Americans were using a great deal of heated shot against mostly wooden buildings, much damage was caused both in the fort and in the town. By the time the Americans captured the fort in May 1813, all the log barracks and presumably the other wooden buildings such as the guardhouse had been destroyed.³¹

Physical Details

In the summer of 1973 an archaeological team headed by Dr. J.P. Wilson, then of the National Historic Parks and Sites Branch of the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs, carried out investigations at Fort George. Its first task was to look for the foundations of the original guardhouse. Just behind the reconstructed guardhouse and almost parallel to it they uncovered stone foundations with dimensions of 49 ft. by 28 ft. From the amount of burned material, these appear to be the foundations of a building which was burnt, probably at the time of the American bombardment in May 1813. It is likely that these are the foundations of the guardhouse of the first fort.

Location

The first question to consider in studying the construction of the guardhouse is its location. The guardhouse was begun in 1798 and probably completed that fall or the following spring. When Gother Mann reported on the accommodations for troops at Fort George, in December 1797, he stated that whatever buildings might be erected should be situated so as to correspond with a future system for their defence and so all the military quarters and stores should be near the blockhouses on the high ground above Navy Hall.¹ These seem to be the only limitations set on the placing of the buildings. It was not until early 1799 that instructions were given for enclosing the post of Fort George with

picketting. The circumference of the picketting was to be twelve hundred yards, presumably because of the somewhat scattered nature of the buildings it was to enclose.² Therefore, when a location was chosen for the guardhouse, there were no walls or gates to influence the choice. Judging from the available plans of Fort George, the guardhouse was near what became the west wall, just to the north of the bastion in the centre of that wall (see Figs. 2, 3) although one plan of the fort, dated 1810, shows no guardhouse at all. This location fits in with one description of events at the time of the mutiny which states that Brock entered the fort by the east gate and walked across the square to the guardhouse. A watercolour by Edward Walsh, a surgeon in the 49th Regiment, done in 1805, shows a small building across the square from the blockhouses, near a bastion and to the northwest of the officers' quarters. This presumably is the guardhouse. One plan of Fort George shows the guardhouse beside a path which seems to come from the Indian Department buildings, across the fort and down to Navy Hall. There would probably be a gate where the curtain crossed this path, which would be fairly close to the guardhouse.

When Wilson's archaeological team began to search the area suggested above they located the foundations of this guardhouse.

Foundation

The foundations uncovered by Wilson are of stone rubble, used just as it was blown up at the quarry. The estimate for the guardhouse calls for one toise of stone. This would allow for a shallow stone foundation. The stone probably came from a quarry near Niagara.

Size

According to the copy of Bruyères's survey of 1802 forwarded by the commanding engineer to the commander in chief in 1803, which is the only copy we have, the guardhouse was 48 ft. long, 20 ft. wide and 12 ft. high (presumably to the wall plate, though this is not stated).³ The estimate does not give any dimensions, but the sleepers and beams allowed for were to be 26 ft. long. The foundations uncovered by the archaeological team had a width of 28 ft. and a length of 49 ft. Possibly there was an error in copying Bruyères's report.

Layout

Bruyères stated that the guardhouse had officer's and soldiers' guardrooms and four solitary cells for confinement.⁴ At the time of the mutiny there were already eight deserters in these four cells, the "four black holes" which were continually full, and once the 12 ringleaders were arrested it is no wonder that Brock sent them to York as soon as possible. The report of the guard for 7 September 1812 mentions an officer's guardroom and a men's guardroom. There were 14 prisoners confined to the guardhouse at that time, but whether they were all in the cells or some detained in the men's guardroom is not recorded.⁵ According to Walsh's picture, the building had two doors on the south side. This would indicate that the two guardrooms ran part of the length of the building with the cell area at the back (see suggested plan, Fig. 5).

Walls

The walls were of horizontal hewn log, probably with dovetailed corners. They were built of pine logs 10 in. to

14 in. deep and sawn to 6 in. thick. Judging from the amount of pine and of oak called for in the estimates, it is possible that the walls of the cell area were of oak logs, 10 in. to 14 in. wide and 8 in. thick. The sleepers were to be of oak, 26 ft. long and measuring 7 in. by 9 in. The sills were of oak 7 in. by 9 in.

Roof

The guardhouse had a hipped roof - the estimate calls for 15 pairs of rafters 18 ft. long and two pairs of hip rafters 23 ft. long. The roof itself was probably of 1-1/2-in. pine plank and was covered with shingles, probably of cedar.

Floors

The floors were probably of 2-in. pine plank (200 planks of this size are called for in the estimate).

Partitions

The estimate calls for 2,000 ft. of pine 4-1/2 in. square, some of which was probably used for the partitions. There is also 400 ft. of pine 10 in. by 10 in., some of which may have been used for the partition between the guardrooms and the cell area to make it stronger.

Exterior and Interior Finishing

The exterior of the guardhouse was most likely weather-boarded at the time it was built - the inch boards in the estimate were probably to be used for weatherboarding. Most of the buildings at Fort George had to be weatherboarded at some time or other to preserve them from the elements.

There seem to be no references in the various estimates for repairs at the post to weatherboarding for the guardhouse so it would seem that this had been done at the time of construction.

The inclusion of lath nails, a barrel of hair, which would be used in making the plaster, and of 50 1/2-in. boards, which would be used for laths, in the estimate indicates a lath and plaster finish for at least one room, probably the officer's guardroom. Possibly the 3/4-in. boards called for in the estimate were also used for interior finishing. The estimate also calls for 112 pounds of white paint, but no other colour. This would have been used for the interior of the officer's guardroom and possibly for other woodwork such as window frames.

Doors

The watercolour by Walsh shows two exterior doors on the south side of the building. With the division of the guardhouse into four cells, a men's guardroom and an officer's guardroom, there would probably be seven doors - one for each cell, a door to the detention area and doors to the two guardrooms (see Fig. 5). If the doors shown by Walsh are the only exterior doors, they would likely be the doors to the two guardrooms. According to a report on the barracks in 1800, the guardrooms had two doors numbered 15 and 16.⁶ In this case there would be a door from the men's guardroom leading to a passage off which the cells would open. The large amount of iron called for in the estimate (280 pounds) suggests that at least one door, probably the one leading to the cell area, was reinforced with iron. The estimate included one pair of large HL hinges (probably for the door to the cell area) and six pairs of small HL hinges (probably for the doors to the cells and guardrooms). There

are two latches and catches, a stock lock and a brass knob lock provided for in the estimate. The latches and catches were probably for the outside doors, the brass knob lock for the door to the officer's guardroom and the stock lock for the door from the men's guardroom to the cell area. No fastenings for the cell doors are provided for in the estimate; it is possible that these were provided out of stock on hand or that they were to be made at Fort George by the blacksmith there. Among the articles listed as being in charge of the guard in September 1812 are five locks and keys.⁷ These may have been the locks for the cells and the door to the cell area, with the lock for the officer's guardroom considered the responsibility of the officer of the day rather than of the guard as a whole. The doors to the cells might have had some type of small barred opening for ventilation.

Windows

According to the report of the guard at Fort George, 7 September 1812, the guardhouse at that time had four windows.⁸ The estimate for building the guardhouse calls for 144 panes of glass, 7-1/2 in. by 8-1/2 in. In the picture by Walsh the windows of the blockhouse appear to be six panes high and at least three panes wide while the windows of the officers' quarters, which are farther away and less distinct, appear to be five panes high and four panes wide. If the report of 1812 were correct, there were probably two windows for each guardroom, along the east and west sides. This would agree with Walsh's picture, which seems to show two windows facing the parade area. These windows seem to have a small lower ledge. No provision is made in the estimate for any type of shutters so that double windows may have been used to keep out the cold. This would

account for the large number of panes of glass called for in the estimate, which may also have included some provision for breakage, a wise precaution when supplies had to be carried over such large distances.

Heating

From the number of bricks provided for in the estimate and from Walsh's picture, it would appear that there was only one chimney in the guardhouse. This seems to be in the centre of the building. A report on repairs needed in Fort George in 1804 mentions that the floor and chimney of the guardhouse needed repairs.⁹ There would probably be two fireplaces, one for the officer's guardroom and one for the men's guardroom. Each fireplace would have a stone or brick hearth and be equipped with a pair of fire irons. In later years stoves were used in the guardhouse. Fort George had some stoves as early as 1798 as at that time some of the stove pans and lengths of stove pipe were unserviceable.¹⁰ By 1812 the guardhouse had two stoves, one of them being in the officer's guardroom.¹¹ The other may have been in the passage leading to the cells or in the men's guardroom. The barracks regulations stipulated an allowance of wood for a guardroom and stated that this was to be delivered daily. Until a much later period there was no provision for cooking in the guardhouse. In the 49th Regiment each man was supposed to have a tin kettle in which his meals could be carried to him when he was on guard.¹²

Cells

According to Bruyères and to various accounts of the mutiny of 1803, the guardhouse at Fort George had four solitary cells. These were presumably built without any source of

light or heat. They would be without any furnishings except perhaps a shelf for sleeping on. The doors would be heavy, probably of oak, with perhaps a small barred opening for ventilation and to allow the guard to check on the prisoners without opening the door, and would probably be fastened with a hasp and staple and a padlock or an iron bar. The walls of the cells may have been of oak (the estimate calls for 800 ft. of oak 10 in. to 14 in. wide and 8 in. thick, some of which may have been for the cell walls).

The Gallery

Judging from the watercolour by Walsh and one of the plans of Fort George, the guardhouse had a gallery with pillars along the east side of it. The foundation which the archaeologists uncovered has projections on that side, which were probably supports for the gallery. These seem to have been built at the same time as the foundation wall.

Furnishings

What would the guardhouse contain? The report of the main guard for 7 September 1812 lists among the articles in charge of the guard two fire shovels, four guardbeds, two tables, three chairs, two forms, one water bucket, two candlesticks, one lantern, one axe, one broom and one board of orders.¹³ The officer's guardroom would have a bed for the officer of the day, particularly in view of the fact that many of the officers lived outside the fort. This may have been included in the guardbeds numbered or it may not. At least one each of the tables and chairs and one or both of the candlesticks would be in the officer's room. The men's guardroom would probably have arms racks and pegs for hanging equipment and coats. The guardbed in the men's

guardroom would be merely a wooden shelf with no bedding or other concessions to comfort.

Privies

No mention of privies is made in connection with the guardhouse inside Fort George. According to Bruyères's report, two privies were required to be built of masonry within the fort, one for the officers and one for the men, each to be 14 ft. long and 8 ft. wide.¹⁴ In a report on the repairs needed at Fort George in 1823, it is stated that the beach guardhouse needed a new privy door.¹⁵ Probably this guardhouse required its own privy because it was so isolated from the rest of the garrison.

Sentry Boxes

While most of the guard were enjoying the sparse amenities of the guardroom, some of the men would always be acting as sentinels, ready to challenge anyone at the gates or call out the guard if necessary. In September 1812 at Fort George there were five sentries by day and seven by night.¹⁶ An estimate was approved in October 1798 for the building of ten sentry boxes at Fort George.¹⁷ This may have included provision for sentry boxes for Navy Hall and the batteaux guard. Unfortunately this estimate included material for building ladders and a shed and enlarging the woodyard as well as for the sentry boxes so that it does not give much information about the construction of the sentry boxes. Two sentry boxes are shown in Walsh's watercolour, one near the powder magazine and one between the guardhouse and the officers' quarters. Unfortunately the details are not very clear, but the sentry boxes seem to have pyramidal roofs, with a rectangular door opening and no windows.

Ground Treatment

Walsh's picture of Fort George indicates a path along the front of the doors of the guardhouse, possibly leading to a gate. There seems to be a path from the officers' pavilion leading in that direction as well. There is no indication of any plants or shrubs around the guardhouse. The ground is not level, but rolling and covered in grass and stubble.

Comparative Study of Other Guardhouses

There are very few plans in existence for guardhouses. The largest collection of such plans is part of the set of plans prepared to accompany Lieutenant Colonel E.W. Durnford's report in 1823. Many of the structures shown in these plans were built during or after the War of 1812 and are much more pretentious than buildings constructed in the earlier period. Also, these plans are not always accurate - for example, plans of the same building are sometimes inconsistent. For guardhouses prior to 1812, even more than for other military buildings of the period, information is very scarce.

Unless otherwise stated, descriptions of guardhouses in 1823 and 1824 are taken from the report by Durnford and the plans which accompanied this report.¹

Types of Guardhouses

Guardhouses varied according to the size of the post and their function. In smaller posts there would probably be only one guardhouse, which would house the men of the guard, the officer of the day and any prisoners there might be, and it would sometimes also contain an orderly room (a regimental or garrison office). Larger posts would often have the cells in one building and guardrooms in another. There would be guardhouses or guardrooms at the gates and in other strategic locations. Some of these guardhouses would have rooms for officers and men, some would merely be one

room to shelter the guard at an isolated spot. The design of the guardhouse would vary greatly depending on its function, the amount of money and type of materials available, the importance of the post and the whim of the engineer in charge.

Location

In most enclosed posts the guardhouse was by the gate. At Fort York the guardhouse was by the gate leading to the town of York.² At Fort Malden the guardhouse was the nearest building to the gate.³ Fort Charlotte in Halifax had its guardhouse near the gate.⁴ In the later barracks built enclosing a square, the guardrooms were at the entrance and frequently on both sides of the entrance. At Quebec guardrooms were at all the gates and at the wharves and other strategic locations as well. The gate was considered the natural location for a guardhouse. In 1798, when the question of fitting up some building as a hospital arose, Gother Mann wrote to Green, the military secretary,

I shall never think it advisable or prudent that the Guard Houses contiguous to the Gates should be made Hospitals of; their situation in the common and most frequented entrances of the Town would be inconvenient to the sick, a nuisance to the Inhabitants and prevent the Guard Houses being made that use of for which they were expressly built.⁵

In cases where the post was not enclosed, the guardhouse was usually by the road leading from the barracks to the town. When the guardhouse was not at the gate there was usually some explanation for this peculiarity. An 1816 map of the buildings at the fort at Coteau-du-Lac shows the guardhouse away from the gate, between the powder magazine and the

barracks; however, a map of 1814 shows that the gate had been moved and that the guardhouse, when built, was by the gate.⁶ A map of St. Johns, Lower Canada, in 1804, shows the existing guardhouse near the shore, presumably considered a strategic location, but it also shows proposed new buildings, including a guardhouse by the gate.⁷

Foundation

In most cases it would seem that where the guardhouse was considered a permanent structure rather than a temporary one, the foundation was of stone. The guardhouse at Amherstburg required three and a half toises of stone for its foundation.⁸ The various guardhouses at Kingston in 1830 had stone foundations.⁹ In later years, particularly with the building of more stone structures, the foundations were deeper. In August 1805 two deserters who were confined in the guardhouse at Fort York escaped by raising a plank of the floor and digging a passage under the logs at the rear of the building.¹⁰ Presumably if any stone had been used in the foundation of this building, it was only in footings or piers. This was probably one of the huts which had been built to accommodate the Queen's Rangers and which were intended to be replaced eventually by more permanent buildings. A plan of the guardhouse at Chambly in 1823 shows quite a deep foundation, but this building is described as having a cellar, which would account for the depth of the foundation. In 1841 the guardhouse at Amherstburg had a foundation 2 ft. deep and 2 ft. wide, while the gallery had a foundation 1 ft. 6 in. by 2 ft.¹¹ Instructions for building a naval guardhouse at Montreal in 1821 stipulated that the foundation was to be sunk at least 3 ft. below the surface of the ground - this guardhouse was to be of stone.¹²

Layout

The layout of a guardhouse varied according to its function, size and style. Some guardhouses, designed solely for the use of a small guard for a particular strategic location, were only one room. When one building contained guardrooms for officers and men, each guardroom usually had a separate entrance. Where there was only one outside door, it usually opened onto a passage with doors leading off it to each guardroom. At the Prescott Gate, Quebec, in 1823, the men's guardroom opened off the stairs and the officer's guardroom opened off the men's guardroom. The officer of the guard was to be afforded as much privacy as possible. An interesting variation on the arrangement of outside doors is shown in 1823 plans of a guardhouse at Sorel and a guardhouse at Mississauga Battery, Kingston, both of which have three doors for two rooms, probably an attempt to preserve symmetry in the facade. Where there are cells as well as guardrooms, several variations in layout appear. In a plan for Blairfindie in 1817, a plan of a proposed guardhouse at Chambly in 1819, and 1823 plans for Coteau-du-Lac and LaPrairie, the cells are at the rear of the building.¹³ At Blairfindie the two cells open directly off the guardroom; at Chambly and Coteau-du-Lac there is an entrance from the men's guardroom to the passage off which the cells open; at LaPrairie the front door opens onto a hallway with entrances to the two guardrooms and the cell block. In all these cases the men on guard could very easily control access to the cells. In other cases the entrance to the cells was separate from that to the guardroom. A plan of the guardhouse at Fort York in 1823 shows a guardhouse with officer's and men's guardrooms, orderly room and four cells. There are four outside doors, with the one to the cell area leading to a passage off which the cells open. A plan of the same year for the garrison

hospital guardhouse at Quebec shows a door on the front of the building leading to the guardroom and a door on the side of the building leading to the black holes. A plan of the guardhouse and solitary cells at Fort Henry, dated the following year, shows a separate outside door to each of the four cells, two doors on the side of the building, one at the front and one at the back, which must have made it most difficult to guard the prisoners. A picture of a guardhouse at Montreal shows separate doors for the guardroom and the cell, with a sentry guarding the door to the cell (see Fig. 11).

Walls

In general the type of material used for the walls of the guardhouse was the same as the material used for other buildings at a post. Most of the earlier guardhouses were of log. In later years, particularly at the larger posts, some guardhouses were of stone. The guardhouse at Amherstburg was described by Durnford in 1823 as being a framed building. A plan of the fort at Amherstburg in 1841 describes the guardhouse as being of brick, and comparing an 1840 plan of the guardhouse with Durnford's plan, it would seem to be the same building, probably with brick covering the original wood or brick nogged (the walls were shown as being 1 ft. 4 in. thick).¹⁴ Stone guardhouses seem to have been built only at Kingston, Montreal, Quebec, and a few of the posts built during the War of 1812.

Roof

Most guardhouses had shingled roofs. A few, such as the navy guardhouse at Montreal, had tin roofs, but this was unusual.¹⁵ The guardhouse at the navy establishment at

Isle-aux-Noix in 1820 was described as having a boarded roof, but this was considered as a temporary building.¹⁶

Floor

Guardhouse floors were of plank. The deserters at York who escaped from the black hole in 1805 did so by raising a plank of the floor and digging their way out.¹⁷ From the estimate for the guardhouse at St. Joseph's Island it would appear that the floor of that building was of 2-in. pine plank (see Appendix E). In the Dégelée Barracks in 1840 the floors were to be of 3-in. pine plank laid on logs.¹⁸

Exterior and Interior Finishing

Most wooden guardhouses had walls covered on the outside with weatherboarding. In some cases the outside was also painted. Sometimes the interior walls were of lath and plaster - particularly for the officer's guardroom - and sometimes they were of plank. In 1830 the guardhouse at Point Henry, Kingston, had the guardroom lined with brick and the cells lined with stone.¹⁹ Sometimes the interior was painted. The estimate for building a guardhouse at Fort William, St. John's, Newfoundland, in 1814, calls for 672 pounds of white paint and 14 pounds of chocolate paint, presumably for the trim (see Appendix F). Once again this type of finishing would be used for the officer's guardroom.

Doors

Guardhouse doors were generally plain doors of vertical boards. In the picture showing a guardhouse at Montreal, the door to the cell seems to have metal studs in it. In 1823 the guardhouse at Fort Mississauga was reported as

needing two new battened doors with hinges, latches and catches.²⁰ The doors would have either strap hinges, as at Fort St. Joseph, or HL hinges, as at Amherstburg (see Appendices D and E). They would probably fasten with a latch and catch and in some cases they would have some type of lock. The estimate for the guardhouse at Amherstburg calls for two stock locks and two padlocks, while for the one at St. Joseph's Island two stock locks were needed. Plans made in 1823 show rectangular transoms above the doors of guardhouses at LaPrairie, Chambly and Quebec. Doors to guardrooms were usually 3-1/2 ft. or 4 ft. wide, while those to the cells were 1.0 ft. or 6 in. narrower.

Windows

There was a great variety of window styles and arrangements in guardhouses. In general the cells had no windows though later cell blocks tended to have ventilating slits for the cells. The guardhouse at Isle-aux-Noix in 1823 had blind windows for the cells on the front of the building in order to preserve the symmetry; these blind windows contained ventilating slits for the cells. The guardhouse for the garrison hospital at Quebec in 1823 had two small, high windows to light the passage in the cell area. In some cases, rooms which were designed for other purposes had to be converted to contain prisoners; in these cases iron bars were fitted to the windows. The windows could be casement, double hung, or fixed. In 1797 an estimate for works to be carried out at Quebec included three dozen sash pullies for the Hope Gate guardhouse.²¹ A picture showing a guardhouse at Montreal (see Fig. 11) seems to show a double hung window. This window had 12 panes of glass, three across and four down. An estimate for a guardhouse at the Cedars, near Montreal, in 1820 calls for four windows of four panes over

three, which in the accompanying plan is shown as three panes across and four down (see Appendix I). A plan of the guardroom at Fort Frederick, Kingston, shows a window divided vertically and having four panes of glass across and three down. There does not seem to be any indication of shutters on any guardhouse windows; possibly the windows were double.

Heating

The early method of heating guardhouses, as well as other military buildings, was by fireplaces. In general the chimney would be built between two rooms, if there were two guardrooms, with a fireplace for each. In 1796 Edward Cross and George Richardson built a chimney with two fireplaces in the guardhouse at Gibraltar Point, York.²² According to the Duke of Kent's barrack regulations of 1800, a guardroom for officers received one room's ration of fuel during the winter months and a guardroom for noncommissioned officers and privates received one room's fuel for every 12 men. A room's fuel was three quarters of a cord of wood, English measure, per week. General Prescott in 1796 had allowed guardrooms a third more fuel than other rooms.²³ Gradually stoves were introduced, first as an additional source of heat. By the War of 1812, stoves were in general use in guardrooms. In the fall of 1811, stoves and pipes were hired for the barrack rooms, guardrooms, etc., occupied by a division of the 100th Regiment stationed at Three Rivers.²⁴ In 1821, as there was no convenience for cooking in the new naval guardhouse at Montreal and as it was considered dangerous to open a fireplace for such a purpose, the naval storekeeper was instructed to purchase a double stove for the guardhouse, which would be useful for cooking and for heating the guardhouse.²⁵ By 1828 the commissary general,

commenting on the new fuel regulations, observed that "open fireplaces are not generally in use in Canada and when used there is for the most part a stove in the same room, all the passages, Halls or entrances are furnished with large stoves without which a house would not be habitable."²⁶ Of course these remarks about heating apply only to the guardrooms; no thought was given to heating the cells.

Cells

The most important point to be remembered in constructing the cells was that they "be fitted up in a strong manner."²⁷ The prisoners must be securely confined; if they were uncomfortable, so much the better. A plan for a proposed barrack near Fort Howe, Saint John, New Brunswick, in 1787, shows trap doors in the guardroom and orderly room which lead down to the black holes.²⁸ Cells which were above ground would have solid thick walls, often of heavier material than the other buildings around them. Instructions for building cells at Chatham, Upper Canada, in 1838, stated that the lining around the cells was to be of 3-in. plank.²⁹ A plan for converting the schoolroom at the Jesuit Barracks, Quebec, into solitary cells in 1823 shows 18-in. brick partitions for the cells.³⁰ The plan for the barracks near Fort Howe in 1787, plans of Fort Henry, Coteau-du-Lac and Isle-aux-Noix in 1823, and plan of an artillery guardhouse at Toronto in 1840 show some form of ventilating slit for each cell.³¹ In other cases there may have been some type of small barred opening in the door for ventilation or perhaps the only form of ventilation was whatever air filtered through the chinks in the walls.

An important feature of the cells was a good strong lock on the door. In 1822 an estimate for converting part of the log barracks at Fort Mississauga into four cells for

solitary confinement provided for four padlocks, bolts and staples. A requisition for repairs needed the following year included one stock lock and key and an iron bolt for the door of a cell at Fort Mississauga.³² The estimate for the guardhouse at Amherstburg calls for two stock locks and two padlocks, while that for the guardhouse at St. Joseph's calls for two stock locks only (see Appendices D and E). The cells shown on various plans vary in size from 6 ft. 6 in. by 4 ft. (Quebec garrison hospital guardhouse in 1823) to 12 ft. 10 in. by 6 ft. (Toronto in 1841). A very rough type of bed may have been provided for the prisoners. A plan of the guardhouse at Coteau-du-Lac in 1823 seems to show a shelf running along the back of the cells a few feet off the floor. An estimate for works at Carillon in 1837 includes two small wooden beds for the cells at 15s. each.³³ The prisoners would sleep, if they could, on the bare wooden bed.

Gallery

A gallery was usually considered a necessary adjunct to a guardhouse. There should be some form of planking, preferably covered by a roof, in front of or beside the guardhouse for the use of the sentry and for the guard to assemble when called out.³⁴ Most of these galleries were 5 ft. wide. They ranged from a simple wooden platform with a roof supported by plain posts (see the Fort York guardhouse, Figs. 13 and 14) to ornate porticos with Grecian columns or arcades. A plan of the guardhouse at Chambly in 1823 shows wide, sweeping front steps, up to a porch with a dormer roof and columns, running half the width of the building. The Royal Artillery guardhouse at Toronto in 1840 had a small porch, 4 ft. by 4 ft., intended merely to shelter the entrance.³⁵

Furnishings

Mens' Guardroom

One of the most necessary furnishings of a guardhouse was the guardbed, on which the men might rest when not on sentry duty. This was a wooden shelf, with a small horizontal ledge at the head, from which it sloped slightly downward (see Fig. 16 for a cross-section of the guardbed). The guardbed was usually about 6 ft. 6 in. from head to foot and might be any width. In some guardhouses one guardbed extended all or most of the length of one wall; in a few cases there were several guardbeds placed head to foot along the wall (for instance the guardroom at the gunboat wharf, Quebec, in 1823). The guardbed was not intended to provide a comfortable night's sleep for the men on guard; rather they should always be ready to respond if called out. Therefore no bedding was provided for it. An estimate for making a guardbed at Carillon in 1837 called for 163 ft. of 1-in. board, 55 ft. of 3-in. plank and 6-1/2 pounds of 3-in. nails.³⁶

The plan of the guardhouse at the garrison hospital, Niagara, 1840 (see Fig. 16), shows one arrangement of furniture in a guardroom. All that is shown in it is a table, stove and guardbed. There would probably be one or two forms or benches to place at the table, as the men on guard had to eat their meals in the guardroom. The regulations for barracks issued by General Prescott in 1796 stipulated that a guardroom was to have a water bucket, an axe, a lantern and a candlestick. Guardrooms were to be allowed three candles, or half a pint of oil, per night during winter months and two candles, or oil in proportion, per night during the rest of the year. The Duke of Kent's barrack regulations issued in 1800 also stated that brooms

were to be supplied to offices and guardrooms in the proportion of one to each room per month.³⁷ A guardhouse usually also had arms racks and a shelf and pegs for storing equipment and coats. A form for the report of the main guard at York in 1812 mentions as well a fire shovel, tongs, a saw, several parts of Ordnance stores and 11 oars, as being in care of the guard.³⁸

Officer's Guardroom

If there were an officer on guard, he too would be provided with a bed, but one of a somewhat more comfortable description than that in the men's guardroom. When a naval guardhouse was built at Montreal in 1821, the iron bedstead for the officer's room had to be cast specially as there was none to be had in Montreal.³⁹ The officer's guardroom would also have the water bucket, axe, broom, lantern, and candlestick set forth in regulations. There would be the same allowance of candles as for the men, but these were to be moulded rather than dipped.⁴⁰ There would probably also be some provision for the officer of the day to write up his report: a desk, perhaps an inkwell, etc. In 1799 the officer's room at the main guard at Quebec needed six new rush-bottomed chairs as those in use were unserviceable.⁴¹

Privies

Guardhouses which were remote from barracks generally had privies close to them. The beach guardhouse at Niagara in 1823 had a privy; when the navy guardhouse at Montreal was built in 1821 it was to have its own privy.⁴² The Castle guardhouse in Quebec in 1823 had a soldiers' privy and an officer's privy (see Fig. 17). Guardhouses near barracks would not have as great a need for privies as the men would

be able to use the facilities of the barrack. In 1802 there occurred at St. Johns, Lower Canada, a complicated dispute between Captain Christie of the 6th Regiment, in command of the post, and some of the officers serving under him. Christie, writing to Lieutenant General Hunter on the subject, said:

when Lt. Col. Thomas [the commanding officer of the regiment] came to St. Johns the second time he asked me if I had given out an order, for the Officer on Guard to remain constantly at his Guard Room. I told him I had. It was an order of Major General Burton's. He then said Sir! Is the Officer not to be allowed to go to the Necessary. I told him I did not think such a thing could be supposed.⁴³

Apparently the necessary was not considered part of the guardhouse.

Sentry Boxes

Each post would have sentry boxes at various important points and in most cases there would be a sentry box outside the guardhouse. The pictures of the Cape Diamond guardhouse and the entrance to Fort York (Figs. 14, 18) show two different styles of sentry box; however, the picture of the entrance to Fort York is somewhat questionable as the building shown should be the guardhouse, but it differs in several important points, such as the number of chimneys and the shape of the roof, from the plan and drawing of this building in 1823. This may be the way the sentry box at Fort York looked at some point, but we cannot establish the date. Stretton's picture of Cape Diamond guardhouse shows a sentry box which is probably typical of the pre-1812 style, with peaked roof, protruding bottom rails and arched

doorway. Unfortunately most existing estimates for building sentry boxes are included with estimates for other buildings and for repairs so that it is difficult to tell what materials were intended for the sentry boxes. An estimate for two sentry boxes at Fort George in 1817 (see Appendix B) indicates that they each had a door and at least one window. Stretton's picture of 1806 shows neither.

Ground Treatment

Little or no thought was given to landscaping British posts in the early 19th century. The ground around the guardhouse would probably be rolling, covered with rough stubble with a pathway beaten by the guard from the guardhouse to the sentry boxes and the parade area. The main point for the guardhouse was that the view and the field of fire be uninterrupted.

The Present Guardhouse

The reconstructed guardhouse at Fort George bears very little resemblance to the original guardhouse. It was based on a building at Fort Mississauga which had been a barracks and part of which had been converted into solitary cells (see Appendix J). The preliminary plan for the reconstructed guardhouse had two guardrooms, with a chimney between, and six solitary cells with a chimney in the middle of the cell area. By the time the guardhouse was built, the partition between the guardrooms had been removed and the fireplace relocated on the end wall. After the building was erected, it was decided that the brick from this fireplace and chimney should have extended through the wall rather than being entirely inside; to remedy this a layer of bricks was added to the outside. The present guardhouse has a gable roof rather than a hipped roof as the original had, two chimneys rather than the one shown by Walsh in his picture, two doors on the side away from the curtain rather than on the side nearest the officers' quarters as shown by Walsh, six cells rather than four, only one guardroom, and no gallery. It is 48 ft. by 16 ft., much narrower than the building indicated by the foundations uncovered in the summer of 1973. The guardhouse as it stands now is very close to the foundations uncovered in 1973 and almost parallel to them, which indicates that when it was built some part of these foundations had been discovered and were used to align the building.

Appendix A. Estimate for Building a Guardhouse at Fort George, 26 December 1797.

Estimate of the expense of the undermentioned necessary buildings proposed to be erected at Fort George:

To erect a Guard House

Carpenter Work	£94.10.0
Masons "	15. 8.0
Labourers "	8.15.0
Shinglers "	6. 0.0
Glaziers "	1. 4.0
Smith "	8.10.0

Materials (Part I)

Fourteen hundred feet running Pine 10 in. to 14 in. deep & sawed to 6 in. thick

two hundred feet running oak 7 in. by 9 in.

fifteen pieces of oak each 26 ft. long, 7 in. by 9 in.

four hundred feet running pine 10 in. by 10 in.

two hundred feet running pine 10 in. by 8 in.

fifteen pieces pine each 26 ft. long 7 in. by 9 in.

eight hundred feet running of oak 10 in. to 14 in. wide 8 in. thick.

fifteen pairs of rafters 18 ft. long 7 in. by 5 in. at one end 5 in. by 5 in. at the other

two pairs of hip rafters 23 ft. long 8 in. by 6 in. at one end 6 in. by 6 in. at the other

Two thousand feet running of Pine 4-1/2 in. square

Fifty 1/2 Inch Boards

Two hundred & eighty 3/4 Inch Boards

Four hundred Inch Boards
 One hundred 1-1/4 Inch Boards
 Two hundred 1-1/2 Inch Pine Plank
 Two hundred 2 Inch Pine Plank
 Nine thousand shingles
 Eighteen thousand shingle nails
 Three thousand lath nails
 Four thousand 10d nails
 Four thousand 20d nails
 Five thousand 30d nails
 Three thousand 40d nails
 Twelve dozen of 1-1/2 Inch screws
 Two dozen of Inch screws
 Two hundred Weight & a half of Iron
 One hundred & forty-four panes of Glass 7-1/2 by 8-1/2
 One hundred & twelve Pounds of White paint
 Thirty six pounds of Putty
 Fifteen gallons of Linseed Oil
 One gallon of Spirits of Turpentine
 Four paint Brushes
 One pair large HL hinges
 Six pairs of small HL hinges
 Two latches & catches
 One stock lock
 One brass Knob Lock
 One Toise of stone
 Six thousand Bricks
 Fifty three barrels of Lime
 One Barrel of Hair
 Thirty loads of sand & water

Materials (Part II)

Materials	Suggested Use
Fourteen hundred feet running Pine	log work
10 in. to 14 in. deep & sawed to	
6 in. thick	

Materials

Two hundred feet running oak 7 in.
by 9 in.

Fifteen pieces of oak each 26 ft.
long 7 in. by 9 in.

Four hundred feet running pine 10 in.
by 10 in.

Two hundred running pine 10 in. by
8 in.

Fifteen pieces pine each 26 ft. long
7 in. by 9 in.

Eight hundred feet running of oak
10 in. to 14 in. wide 8 in. thick

Fifteen pairs of rafters 18 ft. long,
7 in. by 5 in. at one end 5 in.
by 5 in. at the other

Two pairs of hip rafters 23 ft.
long 8 in. by 6 in. at one end
6 in. by 6 in. at the other

Two thousand feet running of Pine
4-1/2 in. square

Fifty 1/2 Inch Boards

Two hundred & eighty 3/4 Inch
Boards

Four hundred Inch Boards

One hundred 1-1/4 Inch Boards

Two hundred 1-1/2 Inch Pine Plank

Two hundred 2 Inch Pine Plank

Nine thousand shingles

Eighteen thousand shingle nails

Three thousand lath nails

Four thousand 10d nails

Four thousand 20d nails

Suggested Use

cills & supports
for gallery
sleepers

between guardrooms
and cell block

Beams

cell walls

Partitions, small
rafters

Lining partitions,
officer's guardroom
interior finishing

covering &
weatherboarding

roof

floors

Materials

Five thousand 30d nails
 Three thousand 40d nails
 Twelve dozen of 1-1/2 Inch screws
 Two dozen of Inch screws
 Two hundred Weight & a half of
 Iron
 One hundred & forty-four panes
 of glass 7-1/2 by 8-1/2
 One hundred & twelve Pounds of
 White paint
 Thirty-six pounds of Putty
 Fifteen gallons of Linseed Oil
 One gallon of Spirits of Turpentine
 Four paint brushes
 One pair large HL hinges
 Six pairs of small HL hinges

 Two latches & catches
 One stock lock

 One brass Knob lock

 One toise of stone

 Six thousand bricks

 Fifty-three Barrels of Lime
 One Barrel of Hair
 Thirty loads of sand & water

Suggested Use

Bars, fittings for
 cell doors, etc.

 officer's guardroom,
 trim
 windows

 door to cell area
 doors to cells and
 guardrooms
 doors to guardrooms
 for door leading to
 cell area
 for door for
 officer's guardroom
 foundation or
 footings
 chimney and
 fireplaces
 plaster and mortar
 plaster
 mortar¹

Appendix B. Estimate for Building Two Sentry Boxes at Fort George, 31 January 1817.

Estimate of the expense required for building two sentry boxes at Fort George, 31 January 1817.

Civil Carpenters Work 10 Days at 10/ per day	£5.0.0
Military Painters " 2 " at 1/9 " "	£0.3.6

Materials

Sixty feet of Scantling Six by Six Inches Square
 Fifty feet of two & half Inch Pine Plank
 Two Hundred feet of one Inch Pine Board
 Four Pounds of Twenty dy nails
 Two Pair of HL Hinges
 Two Sets of Handles Latches & Catches
 Five Pounds of White Paint
 Twenty four Panes of Glass 7 x 9
 Three Pounds of Putty¹

Appendix C. Extracts from Bruyères's Report on the Posts in Upper Canada.

The following are extracts from Bruyères's "Report of the State of the Public Works and Buildings at the several Military Posts in Upper Canada...."¹ relating to the guardhouses at the various posts.

Kingston, p. 4: "The Ordnance Stores, and Guardhouse are Wood Buildings 90 feet long 23 feet wide. The Roofs require to be new Shingled."

Point Frederick, Kingston, p. 5: "The Floor, Roof and Chymney of the Guard House require to be repaired, the new Arm Racks made."

York, p. 6: "The several Hutts erected for temporary Quarters for Officers and Men, also the Blockhouses and Storehouses are in good repair for the number of men at present required to occupy them and Stores to be lodged. There are:... 1 Hutt for Guardhouse with an Officer's Room and Black hole adjoining."

Fort George, p. 6c: "The Guardhouse is 48 feet long 20 feet wide 12 feet high, contains Officer's and Soldiers' Guardrooms, and four Solitary Cells for Confinement."

West Landing, p. 9:

The Guardhouse is a Building 40 feet in length

22 feet wide 10 feet high contains a room for 20 Men, and an Officer's Room. It will require to be Weatherboarded and painted to preserve and secure the Building. The Cill and Floor of the Gallery require to be renewed. The Floors of the rooms repaired. The Chymney and Fireplaces to be repaired and the Stone foundation to be pointed. Five new double moving Births are required. This house has been much injured by converting it into a Canteen and altering the original distribution of the Apartments particular orders are required to prevent this abuse in future.

Chippawa, p. 10: "The Weatherboarding of the detached Kitchen, Bakehouse and Guardhouse to be painted."

Fort Erie, p. 11: "A new Centry Box is wanted there being none at the post."

Amherstburg, p. 15: "The Guardhouse within the Fort is in good repair."

Saint Joseph's, p. 19: "The Guardhouse is a good Building 30 feet long 15 feet wide 8 feet high contains Guardrooms for Officers and Men and 3 Solitary Cells for Black holes. It requires to be Weatherboarded and painted to preserve the Building."

Appendix D. Estimate for Building a Guardhouse at
Amherstburg, 22 December 1796.

Estimate of the work to be done at the post opposite Isle au
Bois Blanc to erect a guardhouse

Carpenters work	£ 82. 0.0
Masons	8. 0.0
Shinglers	4. 5.0
Smiths	1.10.0
Sawyers	12. 0.0
Labourers	5. 0.0

Materials

One hundred forty two feet & a half of 10 in. by 12 in.

Oak timber

Two hundred sixty feet oak 9 by 9

One hundred & ten feet of oak 7 by 9

Ninety seven feet & a half oak 6 by 8

One hundred & eighty feet " 10 inch diam. hew'd on one
side

Four hundred & two feet " 6 by 5

Fifteen hundred feet pine 10 to 15 in. deep 6 inches
thick

Ninety 1-1/2 inch Pine Plank 10 feet long

Thirty " " " 12 feet long

Twenty " " " 15 feet long

Two hundred & twenty inch boards

Eight thousand shingles

Two hundred feet Cube of Pine timbers

Eleven hundred 30 d nails

Eighteen hundred 20 d nails
Eighteen thousand shingle nails
Thirty two panes of glass four pounds putty
Four pairs of HL Hinges
Two stock locks
Two padlocks
Two latches and catches
Six thousand five hundred bricks
Three toises and a half of stone
One hundred & fifty Bushels of Lime
Half a hundred weight of iron¹

Appendix E. Estimate for Building a Guardhouse at St.
Joseph's, 23 January 1798.

Estimates for work to be done on the island of St. Joseph,
To build a Guard House of Log work on a stone foundation

Carpenters work	£ 52.15.0	
Masons work	37.10.0	
Labourers work	5.12.6	
Smiths work	.18.0	
Glaziers work	.12.6	97.8.0

Materials

Twenty four pieces pine 34 feet long 8 by 10 in.)	} log work
Twenty four " " 18 feet long 8 by 10 in.)	
Six pieces Hemlock 18 feet long 8 by 10 in.	sleepers
Six pieces pine 18 feet long 6 by 9 in.	Beams
Sixteen pieces cedar or pine 12 feet long 8-1/2)	} rafters
by 4-1/2 at one end and 6 by 4 at the other)	
Four hundred Inch Boards	covering and weatherboarding
Eight thousand shingles	
Sixteen thousand shingle nails	
Three thousand 30 d Nails	
Two thousand 20 d Nails	
Two pair hook & strap Hinges	
Two stock locks	
One Bar of flat Iron	
Seven toises of stone	
Three thousand of Bricks	
Thirty Barrels of Lime	
Twenty four days of a pair of Horses	
Fifty 2 Inch Pine Plank ¹	

Appendix F. Estimate for Building a Guardhouse at Fort
William, St. John's, Newfoundland, 21 September 1814.

St. John's Newfoundland,
Sept. 21st 1814

Estimate of the Expence of building a new Guard House etc.
at Fort William agreeably to the orders of Maj. Gen. Charles
Campbell Commanding the Troops etc. etc. etc.

Workmanship

Carpenters	57.12.9
Masons	9. 6.8
Smiths	8. 6.8
Painters	1.15.
N.C. Officers	5.
Privates	8. 6.8

Materials

Boards (In feet	Six thousand two hundred
(	
(Clap	One thousand five hundred
Bricks No.	Three thousand three hundred & fifty
Coals Chards	five
Canvas Yds.	five
Glue lbs.	twelve
Glass panes 8 X 10	seventy two
Grates No.	two

(HL Pairs	One
{	
Hinges (Cross garnet	one
{	
(Large hook & eye	four
Iron bar lbs.	five hundred & sixty
(Stocks No.	one
{	
Locks (Iron rim ^d .	one
{	
(Pad doub.	six
Latches & catches	two
Lead (Sheet lbs.	Eighty four
{	
(Pig "	fourteen
Line sash knots	one
Lime Roch Bushels	One hundred & fifty
(40 ^{dy} . lbs.	fifty six
(30 " "	fifty six
Nails (12 " "	two hundred & twenty four
{	
(8 " "	fifty six
{	
(6 " "	one hundred & twelve
Oil Linseed Gallons	sixty four
Putty, Pounds	twenty four
Paint (White lbs.	six hundred & seventy two
{	
(Chocolate "	fourteen
Pullies & pins pairs	two
Plank 2 In. feet	One thousand two hundred
Stones, Tons building	Eighty
Shingles No.	seven thousand

Scantling (6 X 5 feet running	One hundred & forty eight
(	
(6 X 4 "	two hundred & forty eight
(4 X 3 "	seven hundred
(	
(4 X 2 "	four hundred & forty
(	
(6 X 3 "	seven hundred & twenty
Turpentine sp. gallons	sixteen
Teams doub. No.	forty ¹

Appendix G. Estimate for Repairing the Guardhouse at the Beach,
Fort George, 23 October 1815.

Fort George, October 23, 1815

Estimate of the Expense required for repairing the Guard
House on the Beach

Military Carpenters Work 8 days 14s

Materials

Ninety feet of Scantling 3 x 3

One hundred feet of Inch Boards

One thousand one hundred and fifty two shingles 18 Inches

Four pounds of 12d Nails

Six Pounds of Shingle Nails

Four Panes of Glass 7-1/2 x 8

Half a Pound of Putty

One Bushel of Lime

One sheet of Sheet Iron¹

Appendix H. Estimate for Building a Guardhouse at Butler's Barracks, 27 January 1817.

Fort George, 27 January 1817

Estimate of the Expencc Required to Erect a Guard House at Butlers Barracks

Civil Carpenters Work 25 days

Military Masons Work 88 days

Military Labourers 150 days

Materials

Three Hundred and Sixty feet of Square Timber twelve by twelve inches

Seven Hundred and fifty feet of Inch Pine Board

Seventy four Panes of Glass 7-1/2 x 8-1/2

Ten pounds of Putty

One Pair of Strap Hinges

One Bolt

Twelve Pounds of Twelve dy Nails

Twenty four Pounds of Twenty dy Nails

Five thousand four Hundred Bricks

Two Toise of Stone

Thirty six Barrels of Lime

Fourteen Hundred feet of Lath Boards

Twenty five Pounds of Lath Nails¹

Appendix I. Estimate for Building a Guardhouse at the
Cedars, 27 April 1820.

Ci-dessus le dévis d'un édifice proposé, qui doit être
divisé en deux appartimens: l'un pour un officier non
commissionné, l'autre pour les hommes, avec un petit grenier
pour baggage etc. 7 pieds entre les planchers
450 pieds de bois de charpente
1700 pieds de madrier, d'un 1-1/2 pouce pour l'entourage
embouftée
600 pieds de planche pour la courverture
2500 bardeaux pour do.
5000 clous à bardeaux
1500 grands clous
1 porte et 4 chassis de 4 vitres sur 3
48 vitres pour les chassis
1 cheminée au milieu
Ferrures chassis et porte
Aux cèdres 27 avril 1820¹

Appendix J. Estimate for Converting the Log Barracks at Fort
Mississauga into Cells, 19 July 1822.

Fort George 19 July 1822

Estimate of the Expenxe of Workmanship and Materials
required to convert a part of the Log Barracks in Fort
Mississauga into four Cells for solitary Confinement.

Civil Carpenter Work £ 5..15..0

Probably Expenxe of Materials on the spot £ 9..19..19-1/2

Materials

Fourteen pieces of Pine Scantling each 14 feet long 8 x 4
Three hundred and fifty two feet of Pine Plank each sixteen
feet long and 6 inches thick

One hundred and fifty feet of inch Boards

Twenty pounds of 30 dy Nails

Ten pounds of 10 dy Nails

Four pair of Hook and Strap Hinges with rivets

Four Pad Locks, Bolts and Staples

Five Hundred feet of 1-1/2 inch Pine Plank

Twenty pounds of 20 dy Nails

[Plans were later changed and part of these barracks were
converted into six cells]¹

Appendix K. Estimate for Building a Guardhouse in the Ruins
of Fort Massey, Halifax, 5 May 1826.

Halifax, 5 May 1826

Estimate of the expense of erecting a building 17 feet long,
12 feet wide, and 8 feet high the roof and sides boarded and
shingled, the floors to be of two thicknesses of boards, to
have a Chimney and the building to stand on a Stone
foundation proposed to be placed within the ruins of Fort
Massey.

Workmanship

40 days of Civil Carpenters	9
25 " of Military Carpenters	2.7.11
46 " " Masons	4.8. 2

Materials

550 feet Ranging Timber
575 " Sawed Scantling (pine)
2500 " Merchantable Boards
9000 Shingles
1 pair 18 inch Hooks & hinges
1 7 inch iron rimed Lock
1 Strong Thumb Latch
112 lbs. of no. 8 rose Nails
15 " " 10 "
15 lbs. of no. 3 Nails
90 " " 21 "
32 " " 14 lath "
26 panes 10 x 8 Glass
5 lb. putty

26 lb. Iron

20 Tons Building Stone

1000 Bricks

4 Hogsheads White Lime

8 loads Sand

4 bushels Cow hair

2000 laths

5 days of a Single Team¹

Endnotes

Introduction

- 1 George Thomas Landmann, Adventures and Recollections of Colonel Landmann.... (London: Colburn and co., 1852), Vol. 1, p. 289.

General History of the Guardhouse

- 1 Public Archives of Canada (hereafter cited as PAC), RG8, C Series, Vol. 382, p. 23, June 1795.
- 2 PAC, MG23, G, II, 17, Series 1, Vol. 17, p. 25, James Green, Military Secretary, to Deputy Commissary General Craigie, 8 Aug. 1796.
- 3 PAC, RG8, C Series, Vol. 105, pp. 112-4, Estimate of Expenses in Storekeeper General's Department, 25 June-24 Sept. 1796.
- 4 PAC, MG23, G, II, 17, Series 1, Vol. 17, p. 167, James Green to Peter Russell, Administrator of Upper Canada, 27 Dec. 1796.
- 5 PAC, RG8, C Series, Vol. 546, p. 75.
- 6 PAC, MG23, G, II, 17, Series 1, Vol. 22, p. 85.
- 7 George Thomas Landmann, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 21.
- 8 PAC, MG23, G, II, 17, Series 1, Vol. 23, p. 117, Estimate of Works at Fort George, 31 Oct. 1797.
- 9 PAC, RG8, C Series, Vol. 546, p. 189.
- 10 Ibid., Vol. 1208, pp. 139-40, Green to Lt. Col. McDonell, Commanding Officer at Fort George, 12 Jan. 1800.

- 11 Ibid., Vol. 14, pp. 60-1, McDonell to Green, 24 Oct. 1800.
- 12 Ibid., Vol. 513, pp. 55-6b, Sheaffe to Hunter, 2 June 1803.
- 13 Ibid., Vol. 922, pp. 85-8, Sheaffe to Green, 13 Aug. 1803.
- 14 Ferdinand Brock Tupper, The Life and Correspondence of Major-General Sir Isaac Brock, K.B. (London: Simpkin, Marshall and Co., 1847), pp. 26-30; Ontario Archives, Ferdinand Brock Tupper Papers, memorandum by Colonel Fitzgibbon, who was sergeant major of the 49th Regiment at the time of the mutiny; PAC, RG8, C Series, Vol. 922, pp. 77-9, 83-4, Brock to Green, 16 and 17 Aug. 1803.
- 15 PAC, RG8, C Series, Vol. 923, p. 17, Brock to Green, 15 Feb. 1804.
- 16 Ibid., Vol. 922, pp. 80-2, Brock to Green, 16 Aug. 1803.
- 17 Ferdinand Brock Tupper, op. cit., p. 32n, quoting an old pensioner who had served many years in the 49th.
- 18 PAC, RG8, C Series, Vol. 923, pp. 12-6, Brock to Green, 8 Feb. 1804.
- 19 Ontario Archives, Ferdinand Brock Tupper Papers, Patrick Campbell to Tupper, 8 Dec. 1845. Campbell had been an officer in the 49th.
- 20 PAC, RG8, C Series, Vol. 1213, pp. 69-74, B. Foord Bowes, Colonel Commanding in the Canadas, to Lt. Col. J.W. Gordon, Military Secretary to the Duke of Kent, 11 Dec. 1805, with enclosures.
- 21 Ibid., Vol. 1216, pp. 213-4, Craig to H. Calvert, Adjutant General, 8 June 1810.
- 22 Ibid., Vol. 164, p. 253, C. Manners-Sutton, Judge Advocate General, to Craig, 30 Nov. 1810.
- 23 Ibid., Vol. 165, p. 22, David Dundas, Commander in Chief of the army, to Craig, 6 April 1811.
- 24 Ibid., Vol. 1203-1/2F, pp. 111-5, General Orders, 11

- Jan. 1813; PAC, MG24, F, 70, copy of a report to the War Office, 15 Oct. 1812.
- 25 Ontario Archives, Ferdinand Brock Tupper Papers, Patrick Campbell to Tupper, 8 Dec. 1845.
 - 26 PAC, RG8, C Series, Vol. 922, pp. 77-9, Brock to Green, 17 Aug. 1803.
 - 27 Ibid., Vol. 547, pp. 87-8, Brock to Green, 1 Oct. 1803.
 - 28 Ibid., p. 118, Report of repairs wanting to barracks at Fort George and dependancies, 23 Oct. 1804.
 - 29 PAC, RG5, A, 1, Vol. 5, part 1, pp. 1750-1764, Col. Bowes to the Hon. Alexander Grant, Administrator of Upper Canada, 12 April 1806, with enclosures.
 - 30 PAC, RG8, C Series, Vol. 688B, pp. 58-9.
 - 31 Ibid., Vol. 678, pp. 311-13, Lt. Col. John Harvey to Col. Baynes, Adjutant General, 25 May 1813.

Physical Details

- 1 PAC, MG23, G, II, 17, Series 1, Vol. 22, pp. 84-8. Gother Mann, Dec. 1797.
- 2 PAC, RG8, C Series, Vol. 1207, pp. 240-1, Green to McDonell, 21 Jan. 1799.
- 3 Ibid., Vol. 383, p. 6.
- 4 Ibid.
- 5 Ibid., Vol. 688B, pp. 58-9.
- 6 Ibid., Vol. 546, p. 189.
- 7 Ibid., Vol. 688B, pp. 58-9.
- 8 Ibid.
- 9 Ibid., Vol. 574, p. 118.
- 10 Ibid., Vol. 106, pp. 82-3, Return of unserviceable stores at various posts, 11 Aug. 1798.
- 11 Ibid., Vol. 688B, pp. 58-9.
- 12 Ibid., Vol. 1213, p. 181, Plan of Regimental Messing in the 49th Regiment of Foot, 23 May 1806.

- 13 Ibid., Vol. 688B, pp. 58-9.
- 14 Ibid., Vol. 383, pp. 7, 26.
- 15 Ibid., Vol. 574, p. 127.
- 16 Ibid., Vol. 688B, pp. 58-9.
- 17 Ibid., Vol. 1207, pp. 202-3.

Comparative Study of Other Guardhouses

- 1 PAC, RG8, II, Vols. 80-3; PAC, National Map Collection (hereafter cited as NMC).
- 2 PAC, NMC, H4/450 - Toronto - 1816.
- 3 PAC, RG8, II, Vol. 38, p. 28, Plan of Ordnance buildings at Amherstburg, 1831.
- 4 PAC, NMC, H4/250 - Halifax - 1787.
- 5 PAC, RG8, C Series, Vol. 382, p. 93, Gother Mann to Green, 14 Sept. 1798.
- 6 PAC, NMC, H4/350 - Coteau du Lac - 1814 and 1816.
- 7 Ibid., D 350 - St. Johns, L.C. - 1804.
- 8 PAC, MG23, G, II, 17, Series 1, Vol. 21, pp. 192-4, Estimate for works at the post on the Detroit River, 22 Dec. 1796.
- 9 PAC, RG8, II, Vol. 31, pp. 24-8, report on Ordnance buildings at Kingston, 1830.
- 10 PAC, RG8, C Series, Vol. 923, pp. 56-8, Sheaffe to Green, 9 Aug. 1805.
- 11 PAC, NMC, H4/450 - Amherstburg - 1841.
- 12 PAC, RG8, 3, A, Vol. 34, pp. 37-8, Robert Barrie, Acting Commissioner, to Edward Laws, Naval Storekeeper, 22 Feb. 1821.
- 13 PAC, NMC, H4/350 - Blairfindie - 1817; *ibid.*, H4/350 - Chambly - 1819.
- 14 PAC, NMC, H4/450 - Amherstburg - 1840 and 1841.
- 15 PAC, RG8, 3, A, Vol. 34, pp. 38-9, Barrie to Laws, 22 Feb. 1821.

- 16 PAC, MG12, A, Adm. 106/1999, Survey of Buildings at the Naval Establishment at Isle aux Noix, Aug. 1820.
- 17 PAC, RG8, C Series, Vol. 923, pp. 56-8, Sheaffe to Green, 9 Aug. 1805.
- 18 PAC, MG12, B, WO55, Vol. 1917, p. 624, Estimate for fitting up the Degelée Barracks, 31 Jan. 1840.
- 19 PAC, RG8, II, Vol. 31, p. 28, Report on Ordnance buildings at Kingston, 1830.
- 20 PAC, RG8, C Series, Vol. 574, pp. 125-9, Requisition for repairs to the barracks and other buildings, Fort George, 12 June 1823.
- 21 PAC, MG23, G, II, 17, Series 1, Vol. 21, pp. 201-4, Estimate for works at Quebec, 7 Jan. 1797.
- 22 PAC, RG8, C Series, Vol. 115B, pp. 107-8, Voucher for building a fireplace at Gibraltar Point, 31 Aug. 1796.
- 23 Ibid., Vol. 1209, pp. 46-55, Barracks Regulations, 1799-1800.
- 24 Ibid., Vol. 1016, pp. 1-3, Memorial to Sir George Prevost asking that the cost of these be refunded to the troops, 18 Jan. 1812.
- 25 PAC, RG8, 3, A, Vol. 34, p. 104, Barrie to Laws, 20 Oct. 1821.
- 26 PAC, RG8, C Series, Vol. 579, p. 196, Commissary General R.I. Routh to Lt. Col. G. Couper, Military Secretary, 29 Nov. 1828.
- 27 Ibid., Vol. 567, pp. 122-3, Estimate for various repairs, 12 Oct. 1819.
- 28 PAC, NMC, D 250 - Saint John, near Fort Howe - 1787.
- 29 PAC, MG12, B, WO55, Vol. 1917, p. 322, Estimate for barracks at Chatham, 20 Aug. 1838.
- 30 PAC, NMC, H4/350 - Quebec - 1823.
- 31 PAC, NMC, H4/450 - Toronto - 1840.
- 32 PAC, RG8, C Series, Vol. 573, p. 75, Estimate of the expense of converting part of the log barracks at Fort

Mississauga into four cells for solitary confinement, 24 July 1822; *ibid.*, Vol. 574, pp. 125-9, Requisition for repairs to barracks and other buildings, Fort George, 12 June 1823.

- 33 PAC, MG12, B, WO55, Vol. 1917, p. 571, Report of works at Carillon in 1837.
- 34 *Ibid.*, p. 513, commander of the garrison at Toronto to the assistant quartermaster general, 22 Nov. 1839.
- 35 PAC, NMC, H4/450 - Toronto - 1840.
- 36 PAC, MG12, B, WO55, Vol. 1917, p. 571, Report of works at Carillon in 1837.
- 37 PAC, RG8, C Series, Vol. 1209, pp. 46-55, Barracks Regulations, 1799-1800.
- 38 *Ibid.*, Vol. 1203, p. 79, form for report of main guard, Fort York, 1812.
- 39 PAC, RG8, 3, A, Vol. 34, p. 90, James Lunn, Naval Clerk, to Barrie, 23 Aug. 1821.
- 40 PAC, RG8, C Series, Vol. 1209, pp. 46-55, Barracks Regulations, 1799-1800.
- 41 PAC, MG23, G, II, 17, Series 1, Vol. 23, p. 263, order for chairs for officer's room, Main Guard, Quebec, 7 June 1799.
- 42 PAC, RG8, 3, A, Vol. 33, p. 20, Lunn to Laws, 23 Aug. 1821.
- 43 PAC, RG8, C Series, Vol. 829, p. 150, Capt. Archibald Christie to Hunter, 11 Aug. 1802.

Appendix A. Estimate for Building A Guardhouse at Fort George, 26 December 1797.

- 1 PAC, MG23, G, II, 17, Series 1, Vol. 22, Military Secretary's office book, pp. 89-92, estimate of the expense of the undermentioned necessary buildings proposed to be erected at Fort George, 26 Dec. 1797.

Appendix B. Estimate for Building Two Sentry Boxes at Fort George, 31 January 1817.

- 1 PAC, RG8, C Series, Vol. 561, p. 55, estimate of the expense required for building two sentry boxes at Fort George, 31 Jan.

Appendix C. Extracts from Bruyères's Report on the Posts in Upper Canada.

- 1 PAC, RG8, C Series, Vol. 383, p. 1, Gother Mann, Colonel Commanding Royal Engineers, to Major Green, Military Secretary, 3 Jan. 1803.

Appendix D. Estimate for Building a Guardhouse at Amherstburg, 22 December 1796.

- 1 PAC, MG23, G, II, 17, Series 1, Vol. 21, pp. 192-3, Estimate of the work to be done at the post opposite Isle au Bois Blanc to erect a guardhouse, 22 Dec. 1796.

Appendix E. Estimate for Building a Guardhouse at St. Joseph's, 23 January 1798.

- 1 PAC, MG23, G, II, 17, Series 1, Vol. 22, p. 123, Estimates for work to be done on the island of St. Joseph, 23 Jan. 1798.

Appendix F. Estimate for Building a Guardhouse at Fort William, St. John's, Newfoundland, 21 September 1814.

- 1 PAC, RG8, C Series, Vol. 553, pp. 173-4, St. John's Newfoundland, Estimate of the Expense of building a new Guard House etc. at Fort William agreeably to the orders of Maj. Gen. Charles Campbell Commanding the Troops etc., 21 Sept. 1814.

Appendix G. Estimate for Repairing the Guardhouse at the h,
BeacFort George, 23 October 1815.

- 1 PAC, RG8, C Series, Vol. 556, p. 89, Fort George.
Estimate of the Expense required for repairing the Guard
House on the Beach, 23 Oct. 1815.

Appendix H. Estimate for Building a Guardhouse at Butler's
Barracks, 27 January 1817.

- 1 PAC, RG8, C Series, Vol. 561, p. 56, Fort George.
Estimate of the Expense Required to Erect a Guard House
at Butlers Barracks, 27 Jan. 1817.

Appendix I. Estimate for Building a Guardhouse at the
Cedars, 27 April 1820.

- 1 PAC, RG8, C Series, Vol. 126, p. 16, Ci-dessus le dévis
d'un édifice proposé, qui doit être divisé en deux
appartimens: l'un pour un officier non commissioné,
l'autre pour les hommes, avec un petit grenier pour
baggage etc.

Appendix J. Estimate for Converting the Log Barracks at Fort
Mississauga into Cells, 19 July 1822.

- 1 PAC, RG8, C Series, Vol. 573, p. 75, Fort George.
Estimate of the Expense of Workmanship and Materials
required to convert a part of the Log Barracks in Fort
Mississauga into four Cells for solitary Confinement, 19
July 1822.

Appendix K. Estimate for Building a Guardhouse in the Ruins
of Fort Massey, Halifax, 5 May 1826.

- 1 PAC, WO55, Vol. 863, p. 562, Halifax. Estimate of the
expense of erecting a building 17 feet long, 12 feet

wide, and 8 feet high the roof and sides boarded and shingled, the floors to be of two thicknesses of boards, to have a Chimney and the building to stand on a Stone foundation proposed to be placed within the ruins of Fort Massey, 5 May 1826.

Illustration Sources

- 1 Univ. of Michigan, William L. Clements Library, "The Esplanade, Fort George, 1805," by Edward Walsh.
- 2 PAC, NMC, V2/440 - Niagara - 1799, Plan of proposed works at Niagara, 1799.
- 3 PAC, NMC, H1/440 - Niagara - 1793, Plan of Fort George, probably 1803-04.
- 4 PAC, RG8, C Series, Vol. 1203-1/2F, inside front cover, Scenes at La Prairie, 1812-14.
- 6 PAC, NMC, H4/350 - Chambly - 1819, Proposed guardhouse at Chambly, 1819.
- 7 PAC, NMC, H4/350 - Coteau du Lac - 1823, Guardhouse, Coteau-du-Lac, 1823.
- 8 PAC, NMC, H4/450 - Kingston - 1824, Guardhouse and solitary cells, Fort Henry, 1824.
- 9 PAC, NMC, H4/450 - Amherstburg - 1823, Guardhouse, Amherstburg, 1823.
- 10 PAC, NMC, H4/450 - Amherstburg - 1841, Guardhouse, Amherstburg, 1841.
- 11 PAC, Picture Division, C-39751, "Bringing a few friends to dine in Barracks."
- 12 PAC, NMC, H4/450 - Toronto - 1833, Proposed guardhouse at York, 1833.
- 13 PAC, NMC, H4/450 - Toronto - 1823, Guardhouse, Fort York, 1823.
- 14 Metropolitan Toronto Library, John Ross Robertson Collection, No. 668, "Eastern and main entrance to Old

Fort York," by Frederick Victor Poole.

- 15 PAC, NMC, H4/350 - Montreal - 1823, Main guardhouse, Montreal, 1823.
- 16 PAC, NMC, H4/450 - Niagara - 1840, Niagara garrison hospital and dead house, 1840.
- 17 PAC, NMC, H4/350 - Quebec - 1823, Officer's and men's privies, Castle Gate guardhouse, Quebec, 1823.
- 18 PAC, Picture Division, C-14825, View of Cape Diamond Guardhouse, 12 June 1806, by Sempronius Stretton.
- 19 PAC, Picture Division, C-14813, St. Louis Gate Guardhouse, Quebec, 1806, by Sempronius Stretton.

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MG24, A, 6, Peter Hunter

MG24, F, 70, Thomas Evans

RG5, A, 1, Upper Canada Sundries

RG8, C Series, British Military Records

RG8, II, Ordnance Records

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
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Ferdinand Brock Tupper Papers

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ILLUSTRATIONS




1 "The Esplanade, Fort George," 1805, by Edward Walsh, surgeon of the 49th regiment. The guardhouse is on the far right of the picture. Note the style of the gallery and of the sentry boxes. (University of Michigan, William L. Clements Library.)




References

- a Blockhouse
- b Magazine
- c Hospital & Kitchen
- d Officers Quarters & Kitchens
- e Guard House
- f Set of Blockhouses
- g Storehouses
- h Wharf


- 2 Plan of proposed works at Niagara, 1799, showing the location of the guardhouse and possibly a path running from the Indian Department past the guardhouse. (Public Archives of Canada.)



- 3 Plan of Fort George, probably 1803-04. This plan has been dated 1793, but as it incorporates the improvements suggested by Bruyères in his 1802 report, it probably dates from 1803 to 1804. It shows the position of the guardhouse and indicates the gallery. (Public Archives of Canada.)




4 Scenes at Laprairie, 1812-1814. This shows a military execution somewhat similar to that at Quebec in March 1804 when the sentences on the Fort George mutineers were carried out; however, in the latter case all those condemned to death were shot together, rather than singly as shown here. (Public Archives of Canada.)



- 5 Suggested plan of the guardhouse at Fort George based on the information in Bruyères's report of 1802 (see Appendix C), Walsh's picture (Fig. 1), and the preliminary reports on the archaeological excavations at Fort George in the summer of 1973. (Drawing by S. Epps.)

Disposition of Proposed
Guard House *Chambly.*





Scale 20 Feet to an Inch.


- 6 Proposed guardhouse at Chambly, 1819. This guardhouse has separate entrances for the officer's and men's guardrooms, with the corridor leading to the cells opening off the men's guardroom. The plan shows the widths of the doors and windows. (Public Archives of Canada.)




*Guard house, framed building, splinter proof, lined roof
in good repair.*




- 7 Guardhouse, Coteau-du-Lac, 1823. This guardhouse has only one entrance. The officer's guardroom has the greatest privacy as no other rooms open off it. Entrance to the cells is controlled from the men's guardroom and no fireplaces are indicated. Probably both guardrooms were heated by stoves. The section seems to indicate some form of raised platform for sleeping in the cells and also an opening in the cell walls. (Public Archives of Canada.)



- 8 Guardhouse and solitary cells, Fort Henry, 1824. In this interesting layout, each cell has its own outside door and the doors are on three walls of the guardhouse. The door to the cell shown in the elevation is narrower than that to the guardroom. The walls of the cells are much thicker than those of the guardroom. (Public Archives of Canada.)




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
- 9 Guardhouse, Amherstburg, 1823. This would seem to be the same building as shown in Figure 10. The dimensions of the guardhouse in 1823 are given as 20 ft. by 25 ft.; the dimensions of the 1841 building (Fig. 10) are 20 ft. by 24 ft. The gallery seems to be the same width in both cases and has the same number of posts along the front. It would seem that the side galleries were accidentally omitted from the 1823 plan. (Public Archives of Canada.)



- 11 "Bringing a Few Friends to Dine at Barracks," by H.B. Lawrence. This shows a guardhouse in Montreal in the 1860s. It is by the gate, has separate doors to guardroom and cell, and a gallery. Some details of the doors and windows are shown. The two chimneys indicate heating for the cell. (Public Archives of Canada.)






- 12 Proposed guardhouse at York, 1833. This plan gives very complete measurements for the building. Of particular note in both plan and section is the fireplace, 1 ft. 6 in. deep, 3 ft. 4 in. wide and 3 ft. 6 in. high. Both window and door are shown with small bottom ledges. (Public Archives of Canada.)

N^o 4 PLAN of the Guard House.*Elevation on the Line AB.**Section on the Line CD.*


- 13 Guardhouse, Fort York, 1823. This shows a simple gallery with very plain posts; the line of the roof covers the gallery. Only one chimney and one fire-place are shown. (Public Archives of Canada.)




- 14 "Eastern and main entrance to Old Fort York," by Frederick Victor Poole. If this is the eastern entrance to the fort, then according to an 1816 map of Fort York, the building shown must be the "Officer's and Men's Guard House, Orderly Room and Blackholes," a plan of which is shown in Figure 13. However, this building has more chimneys, fewer windows and fewer supports for the gallery than shown on the Durnford plan. The gallery roof is interesting as it is an extension of the main roof rather than the type shown in the Durnford plan. The sentry box differs greatly from the one shown by Stretton (Fig. 18), but seems to be somewhat similar to those shown by Walsh (Fig. 1) though the latter are unfortunately too indistinct to be examined closely. (J. Ross Robertson Collection, Metropolitan Toronto Public Library.)

*Main Guard House.**Montreal.*

- 15 Main guardhouse, Montreal, 1823. Somewhat ornate pillars support the gallery roof, which is part of the main structure. (Public Archives of Canada.)




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


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
- 16 Niagara hospital guardhouse and dead house, 1840. The plan shows an arrangement of furniture in a guardroom; the section shows the design of the guardbed. (Public Archives of Canada.)




PLAN



ELEVATION




PLAN




ELEVATION

- 17 Officer's (below) and men's (above) privies, Castle Gate guardhouse, Quebec, 1823. (Drawing by S. Epps from the original in the Public Archives of Canada.)



- 18 "View of Cape Diamond Guard House," 12 June 1806, by Sempronius Stretton. This picture shows a sentry box quite clearly. Note the projecting bottom rails. (Public Archives of Canada.)



- 19 St. Louis Gate guardhouse, Quebec, 1806, by Sempronious Stretton. This picture was originally titled "View of St. John's Gate Guard House," but on revisiting Quebec, Stretton discovered his mistake. This guardhouse is placed in a strategic location with an excellent view. Note the unusual porch treatment. (Public Archives of Canada.)

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- 13 The American Capture of Fort George, Ontario, by Margaret Coleman; The Guardhouse at Fort George, Ontario, by Elizabeth Vincent. 1977.